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Albania: Copper Workers Protest 'Plight' of Industry

AU1704090496 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 16 Apr 96 p 15

[Article by Milto Baka: Copper Industry Appeals to Government]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stop the further decline and find a way out of the plight to which the copper industry has been reduced. This is the appeal that 4,000 workers, supporting a total of 20,000 family members, addressed recently to the president and the government. The virtually complete collapse of the industry as a whole, and the mines especially, has now been recognized.

The harsh and bitter transition involving part-time work or the halving of the labor force has led to a decline in living standards, and the trade unionists are asking at least for some alleviation of their serious situation. Their wages are what they have always been, but the value of the lek has changed. The price of copper has doubled on the market, but working conditions are the same as in past years.

There is now a vital need to revive this branch of industry, but it is steeped in debt to the point that monthly wages and social security and health insurance payments are in jeopardy.

The workers say that the difficult situation has not prevented the government from issuing licenses for private traders to sell pure copper, which has led to abuses and corruption. Employees and specialists openly aired their opinions and suggestions to overcome this situation at a meeting a few days ago, speaking out as a genuine trade union opposition and not as an instrument of the government. They demanded that the copper works at Rubik be put to work, in order to make a full copper production cycle possible within the country. Meanwhile, the government is announcing tenders for imported copper wire for Telekom, thus opening the way to fraud and abuses.

The worries of the copper industry and those who work to extract and process it are increasing every day. The worried workers and specialists are looking to see what they can do, from the establishment of realistic work norms to a fair distribution of the profits that are earned, from release from the authority of the corporation to investment in cooperation with powerful firms, and from technological and mechanical reform to investment in housing—because workers are still living in huts from the 1970's.

At a time when profits from copper are high and the corporation is raising prices, investments have been minimal and the government is powerless to intervene to change the situation. The mass privatization of the mines remains a general idea, while the trade unionists in the copper industry are asking for seats on the government-created commission, because those who work or have worked all their lives in the seams must be the main stockholders. Our demands are not impossible to achieve, and we are ready to confront the government. Thus runs the appeal of the workers and the specialists of the copper industry to find a way out of their serious position and to ensure continued production and profits from this vital branch of the Albanian economy.

Bulgaria: Kwasniewski Notes Bulgarian Differences on NATO

AU1604105696 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 16 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Yovka Dimitrova: "Kwasniewski: Zhelev and Videnov Differ on NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have noted certain differences in emphasis between President Zhelev and Prime Minister Videnov regarding European security. This is what Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski noted after his eight-hour visit to Bulgaria on 13 April.

After meeting President Zhelev, Kwasniewski requested a 15-minute private meeting with Prime Minister Videnov, which had not been scheduled. Kwasniewski noted that, while in the Bulgarian cabinet there is no hesitation over European integration, things are different where NATO is concerned.

"Expanding NATO is the continuation of the reform that began in 1989 and which must result in a Europe without any division and barriers," Kwasniewski said. There can be no European security without Moscow, but no one could impose any veto, the president said.

He was assured that by 1996 Bulgaria will have paid off its debt of 125 million transaction rubles.

Kwasniewski was addressing the second meeting of Central and East European countries organized by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE. "Our problem is not where we are going or whether we will succeed, but whether we will accomplish it soon enough," the Polish president said.

Bulgaria: Videnov Views Reform at EBRD Meeting

AU1604152696 Sofia PARI (Special supplement) in English 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Lyudmila Videnova: "EU Trade Policy Shuts Western Markets to Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Structural adjustment of Bulgaria's real sector will cost more than USD 300 million in stage one, during which over 100 money-losing state-owned enterprises, accounting for over 20 percent of the aggregate losses of the national economy, will be closed down, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov said, addressing the opening of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Sofia yesterday.

The first phase of the banking reform will require another USD 500 million, he added. The idea is to stop the decapitalization of banks, start their recapitalization, and set up a bad-debt collection agency. Foreign shareholders will be sought for Bulgarian banks, the head of government explained.

"We can but encourage Bulgaria to take steps to arrive speedily at an agreement with international financial institutions, and in particular the IMF," EBRD's President Jacques de Larosiere said in an opening statement at the Annual Meeting. He introduced the Bank's new member, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and assessed 1995 as a successful year for the EBRD operationally. The Bank finds that economic growth tends to stabilize in Central and Eastern Europe, and was not surprised by certain political or economic upheavals in the region. The Bank will continue to fulfill its basic mandate to support the private sector and comply with the requirement set by its Charter that 60 percent of the commitments go to the private sector.

The next few years will be decisive for the transition to market economy, which is why Mr. de Larosiere believes that an increase of the Bank's authorized capital stock from ECU 10,000 million to 20,000 million would help sustain future activities and pursue a manageable growth strategy.

ECU 900 million have been approved for 26 Bulgarian projects with the EBRD, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov said at the official opening of the Meeting. Bulgaria backs the idea of increasing the Eurobank's capital and will continue work with the EBRD, the Prime Minister noted. He blamed internal and external factors for the insufficiently rapid progress of the economic reform in this country. Among the internal reasons, he singled out political instability, the ignored structural reform, the underrated social impact of changes. According to Mr. Videnov, the major external reasons for the slowdown of reforms have been the embargoes against Iraq and rump Yugoslavia, as well as the disintegration of Bulgaria's traditional markets: COMECON and the USSR.

Bulgaria: Officials Comment on Romanian Nuclear Plant

AU1704114496 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Apr 96 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Bulgaria on the Alert"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Marin Peychev, chairman of the Silistra City Council, director of the Public Health Department, and chairman of the Silistra-Kalarasi Joint Bulgarian-Romanian Ecology Commission:

For several months now, we have been in a state of active observation. We have special written materials, which include a list of all the theoretical variants regarding the hazards of the Cerna Voda Nuclear Power Plant. In principle, every nuclear power plan evokes concerns. Data produced by the preliminary study shows that the Romanian nuclear power station is safer than Chernobyl. It utilizes heavy water for delaying the nuclear reaction and, therefore, our experts think that only the water is threatened by the nuclear power station.

The Bulgarian cities are further upstream on the Danube River. Nevertheless, the concern remains. Experts are registering the radiation from Tutrakan to Balchik. The Public Health Departments must take samples of the food, vegetation, the Danube water, fish, crabs, and so forth. They will be examined every month at the Ruse Center of Radiation Hygiene.

The Ministry of Environment has promised us automatic equipment.

Khristo Nechev, chairman of the Ecoglasnost Independent Movement-Silistra:

We have asked our National Assembly members Ana Milenkova, Vasil Kalinov, and Kemal Eyup to collect some information about the Cerna Voda Nuclear Power Plant and distribute it to the population.

It is true that the water of the Danube flows in the opposite direction, but it is well known that its fish swim not only with the stream, but also against it. We want the deputies to commit themselves to the issue, because it is impossible to institute direct contacts between nongovernmental organizations and the municipalities of Bulgaria and Romania.

Srebri Vulchev, expert at the "Social Relations" Department of the National Electricity Company and member of the Bulgarian Nuclear Society:

It is not right to creates a phobia regarding the Cerna Voda Nuclear Power Plant, as the Romanians themselves did in the past over the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.

Tikhomir Stoilov, senior scientific fellow and member of the Bulgarian Academy of Science Nuclear Institute:

Cerna Voda has modern and stable equipment. This type of reactor was developed in Canada. We are not concerned that there are not enough Romanian experts, because for at least a year the nuclear power station will operate under the supervision of Canadian and French experts. Only when the company is convinced that there are good Romanian experts will its own experts depart. Romania has not been acting hastily. It has carefully constructed the nuclear power station and selected the best companies and technologies.

Bulgaria: Completion of Romanian Nuclear Plant Doubted

AU1604125296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Boyan Rubin: "Nuclear Yardsticks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having begun the construction of the Cerna Voda Nuclear Power Plant in 1980, tomorrow Romania will officially open it, although I am not sure whether it really is completed. My doubts are based on the fact that only one reactor will be activated, while only about 30 percent of the construction of the others has been completed. Were it not for certain minor details, the Bulgarians could rejoice at the successes of their neighbor.

For example, the reactors to the north of our border, near Silistra, have been declared the latest thing in nuclear safety, while those of Kozloduy are said to be almost the most dangerous in the world. This is so despite all the statements issued by the government and the readiness expressed by Bulgaria to cooperate in improving the safety of our nuclear power station, the measures that were taken, the money spent, and the differences in the experts' assessments. In addition, no one notes that Bulgaria has certain absolutely legitimate demands regarding Cerna Voda.

Hardly anyone could doubt the quality of the technology, which was developed in Canada, or the high degree of equipment safety. What we mean is something much more important and essential, namely, whether at the Moscow meeting certain economic superpowers—and this means everything in the modern world—would not find themselves in the awkward position of having to use an obsolete yardstick to measure nuclear technologies. It is well known that such yardsticks have one length in Bulgaria, another in Russia, and yet another somewhere else....

Bulgaria: Risks of Cernavoda Nuclear Plant Considered

AU1704135196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Apr 96 p 10

[Unattributed commentary: "How the Romanian Nuclear Power Station Will Poison the Waters of the Danube"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Romanians will switch on the first nuclear reactor at their Cernavoda Nuclear Plant. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Cretien will be attending in person as a mark of respect to our neighbors, who have built the nuclear power station only 60 km as the crow flies from Silistra, practically in the Danube delta.

The Canadian Atomic Energy Company and the Italian firm Ansaldo Spa are completing the project started by Ceausescu, who turned the first sod at Cernavoda in 1979. About five years ago, the Canadians and Italians started working hard at the site, which is supposed to include five reactors. So far, however, only the first reactor is ready, while the second is only 30-percent completed. The next two reactors are to start operating by the year 2000. This will happen if the Romanian Government manages to find the credits. So far, the nuclear power station has swallowed up over $600 million.

Bucharest is trying to convince us of the reliability of the concrete shell enclosing the reactor, claiming that the risk is minimal in the event of an earthquake, for example. It is claimed that the safety system acts five times faster than the one at Chernobyl. Bucharest has also told AFP that a computer controls everything. The Danube River is supposed to remain crystal clear, because the location chosen for the nuclear station is such that the water used to cool the reactor will have no contaminating effect.

However, even when the reactor was under construction, reports appeared of increased radiation around Cernavoda. The reactor operates on natural uranium and heavy water, which is an artificial element and presents a risk when released into the environment. On top of everything, the project envisions discharging the water used for cooling the equipment into the Danube-Black Sea Canal at a temperature seven degrees higher than the river water. In addition, the outgoing cooling water is full of noxious substances produced during the reactor's operation.

A large number of Romanian and Bulgarian settlements along the Danube draw water from the river. According to experts, the plant poses a hazard to the health of the population of Constanta, Navodari, Silistra, and the surrounding villages.

At the beginning of 1995, Gabriel Pascu, the greatest Romanian nuclear scientist, lost his post because of his suspicions about the risk posed by the Romanian nuclear power station. In an interview to the Bucharest newspaper EXPRES, Pascu said that he had repeatedly notified Parliament and the Romanian Ecology Ministry about the potential threat to the population in the region. Otherwise, the dismissal of the nuclear engineer was attributed by the local press to unproved "disciplinary violations."

Top nuclear experts in Bulgaria fear that the Romanians have no qualified personnel to operate the nuclear station. For the time being, the Canadians hold a monopoly over the Candu reactors, and proper training of specialists in this unpopular nuclear technology can only be carried out in Canada.

Although the nuclear station represents a solution to Romania's 10-year-long energy crisis, it seems that no one in that country is glad about the reactor's commissioning, according to AFP, which notes that the local population finds it impossible to forget the horror of the Chernobyl disaster and is suspicious of any nuclear technology.

Bulgaria: SDS Candidate Challenges Zhelev to Debate

AU1604153596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 16 Apr 96

[Report by Verginiya Vurbanova]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Sofia today, the political council formed by the parties that signed the political agreement on the presidential primaries met to discuss the drafting of a procedure to enable certain extraparliamentary forces to join the political agreement. The political council will seek a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev to ask for government support in holding the presidential primaries.

The Central Electoral Commission for organizing the presidential elections today adopted the rules for holding the elections. There will be 31 regional electoral commissions and 3,000 local electoral commissions. The candidates' names are to be printed on white ballot papers, and the name of the candidate chosen is to be marked. A meeting of the Central Electoral Commission is due to start about now, at which the commission will discuss the distribution of the polling stations throughout the country, to enable all citizens to exercise their voting rights.

At the end of a briefing he gave today, Petur Stoyanov presidential candidate of the Union of Democratic Forces, invited Zhelyu Zhelev to take part in a public debate with him on the topics of uniting the opposition before the primaries and winning the votes of the so-called silent majority.

Czech Republic: Necas Views Army Tenders, NATO Entry

AU1604125096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 13 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas by Vitezslav Kulich; place and date not given: "We Will Economize by Entering Into NATO; Neutrality Would Cost a Lot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kulich] In your opinion, what should the Czech Army actually be like?

[Necas] It should be like the result of a series of several concepts. The foundation stone should be to define our national interests and the risks the Czech Republic faces. A concept for national security should be formulated according to them. A strategy for national defense should be developed from it. This should, in the event of a threat, guarantee the state's basic functions and the mobilization of the Army and the whole economy. A military strategy and a concept for the Czech Army should come out of it first. So far, however, we have proceeded from it. A military strategy was approved in 1995, but it is obvious that there is still no concept for defense as a more complex whole. We started from precisely the opposite end that we should have.

[Kulich] Why then, if the Army does not know what it will be like, is it announcing new tenders and demanding additional resources from the state budget?

[Necas] These more general concepts are not so much a matter for the Army as for its civilian management. It should give the military an assignment, and it should establish it accordingly.

[Kulich] But how do you explain the relatively rapid pace in announcing tenders?

[Necas] I think the General Staff is aware of the need to modernize the Army and is trying to speed up the whole process as much as possible. One can only speculate on the other reasons—outside of Army circles—if there are any. I would not like to get into this. But this rapid pace makes me uneasy. So far, tenders have been completed or begun whose potential volume amounts to approximately 45 billion korunas.

[Kulich] So, in your view, the squabbles between the Defense Ministry's People's Party management and the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] were more of an attempt to peek under the departmental lid at the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]?

[Necas] These squabbles ensued from exchanges of fire in the media. Therefore, I would detract a little from their dramatic nature. Moreover, not only the ODS is interested in this, but also all political representatives.

In such an important department as defense, the maximum effort has to be made to make the Army's economic management transparent. Finance is the basic means of civilian control over the armed forces.

[Kulich] Do you consider the economic management of defense so far to be transparent?

[Necas] It is still necessary to do many things.

[Kulich] Do you think it is appropriate for the Army to make decisions on tenders behind closed doors and not to state, for instance, why a tender has been canceled?

[Necas] I have never made a secret of the fact that a new mechanism should be drawn up for the selection procedures, that key projects should be considered from a broader perspective than the perspective of the Defense Ministry. I feel that the current tenders are being limited to how much they will cost and what kind of product we will get for it. There is, for instance, a foreign political or industrial dimension. Whom we cooperate with, whether and to what extent foreign technologies are transferred to the Czech Republic, and how Czech industry participates in the tenders are not irrelevant. Moreover, the majority of the activities are concentrated in one place in the department—in the economic section. Abroad, these powers are divided at least into material and financial parts that control one another. For this reason, too, the decisionmaking circle has to be considerably wider.

[Kulich] Specifically, how do you conceive achieving this transparency?

[Necas] By ensuring that the government or a group of ministers express their views on it.

[Kulich] Why has this not been the case so far?

[Necas] I cannot comment on that.

[Kulich] So, in your opinion, until now, the ministry has been announcing tenders only in accordance with its own requirements instead of ensuring that they correspond to the comprehensive needs of the state?

[Necas] In essence, yes.

[Kulich] Why then are you pushing for an increase in expenditure on defense?

[Necas] This is only in the event that the financing of the Army would really be more transparent and effective. Our armed forces have to be modernized. We also envisage their professionalization to a greater extent, which may also increase the pressure on the department's overall budget.

[Kulich] Do you think that, in this respect, admission to NATO will be a boon for us?

[Necas] Collective security is somewhat cheaper than individual defense. Neutrality would also be terribly expensive. It is not cheap politically or financially. Look at Sweden or Switzerland.

[Kulich] So, by entering into NATO, we will actually be economizing?

[Necas] If we want to have an effective defense, then, in the long term, yes. By entering into NATO, we will indeed, in essence, economize. It is like when you insure yourself against fire. If you make the payments on your own, these have to be relatively high sums. If you are in an insurance plan with other people, the installments are substantially lower.

[Kulich] And when will the Czech Republic begin to make savings?

[Necas] During the preparations for entry and after entry to NATO, we have to achieve complete compatibility with its armed forces. This will cost a certain amount. But we would have to pay for Army modernization anyhow. If we do not want to, instead of an army, there would only be the castle guard.

[Kulich] Let us return to the tenders. Apparently you have read secret reports on problematic tenders. Have you learned anything?

[Necas] Some documents were very interesting. However, they contain state secrets. Therefore, I cannot comment.

[Kulich] The Army tenders in the Czech Republic are, apparently, accompanied by widespread corruption. The ODS has also been accused of influencing the tender for the staff information system.

[Necas] This selection procedure was in full stream at the time I arrived at the ministry. Therefore, the possibility of any kind of influence does not come into consideration. To say nothing of the fact that I, as first deputy, do not have any decisionmaking powers over public tenders. The economic section and the minister have them. I merely proposed that a practical test be carried out of the computer systems on offer, which would verify whether they are at all functional. Nothing else. I think this is quite normal, especially in selecting hardware worth several billion korunas.

[Kulich] Was there a justifiable suspicion that the system from the Unisys company would not function?

[Necas] I did not want to test one, but several. The selection commission had reservations about each of them.

[Kulich] But a letter was made public in which you suggested to the minister that he cancel the tender.

[Necas] It was not a letter but an informative report. I sign—better, cosign—several of them every day. It said in it that, if it is ascertained that the system will not function, I would not hesitate to cancel the tender.

[Kulich] Is it true that, in the end, it was not you who proposed canceling the tender but the KDU-CSL's economic deputy, Miroslav Kalousek?

[Necas] I will not refute this. The defense minister decided last year to cancel the tender on the basis of mistakes that were made during the course of the competition.

Czech Republic: Daily Considers Alternatives to NATO

AU1604183596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Apr 96 p 12

[Commentary by Pavel Dominik: "NATO Does Not Have To Be the Only Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the basic strategy of our foreign policy concept—integration into the European and transatlantic structures—is correct and unequivocal, the current situation regarding the process of NATO enlargement points clearly to the necessity of more flexible tactics by our diplomacy. If pragmatism is the basic philosophy for the current governing coalition in all spheres, then it must also apply in foreign policy. It is impossible to make do with an unalterable strategy, albeit actively promoted and well concealed behind the "absolute idea" of our security. Complacency about one's infallibility and the correctness of a single path may lead to a loss of judgment and level-headedness and, in the final analysis, to a rude awakening.

The most recent developments have given rise to trial balloons from the Russian side in the form of a modified approach by Moscow to the alliance's enlargement (involvement by the new members in NATO's political structures only). Russia is making it clear that it is willing to compromise, a compromise that to us, at first glance, appears to be unacceptable Russian interference in our affairs with the alliance. Our official stance toward this new Russian initiative, however, proceeds from inertia and passivity in our assessments of Russian foreign policy and of relations between Russia and the West in general. Certainly it is possible to refer to the negative reaction of NATO Secretary General Solana in Moscow. But let us not be deceived by this. It is possible to assume that this bargaining space, which is at the moment admittedly very confined, will be a starting point for further talks for both NATO and

Russia. Let us not forget that, according to NATO representatives, 1997 will be a year of dialogue with Russia. In other words, the alliance is trying to gain another year of valuable time to postpone a definitive decision on enlargement.

In this connection, we should at last bear in mind that, despite all of the common values uniting us with the euro-atlantic civilization, the global threats to and national interests of the "major ones" lie elsewhere than in Central Europe. In the long-term perspective, the West's interest in the integrity of Russia as a barrier is indisputable, and not exclusively as a military barrier, but also, to say the least, as a political and economic one against the advancing Far Eastern civilizations and militant Islam. It follows from this that the West will not risk a deterioration in relations with Moscow for the sake of enlarging the alliance, an enlargement that would not mean for NATO the strengthening of its security as a whole and, consequently, the security of its new members.

What lessons can be drawn from this for us?

1. First and foremost—and this is the greatest shortcoming of our current foreign policy—it is necessary to consider aloud (which, with the exception of part of the research sphere, does not happen) the alternatives for our course of action in the event of developments in the security situation so far not considered by us. Pessimistic options are only spoken of in connection with developments in Russia.

2. We also have to be prepared for the option of just our political incorporation into NATO, which could be offered to us as the maximum possible.

3. As has already been suggested in the introduction, our clamping onto NATO as the only means of guaranteeing our security places us in danger, by its one-sidedness, of ignoring and belittling any other possibilities for our security policy, especially if the alliance is not enlarged in the short- and medium-term perspective.

4. In light of the above, this gives rise to the necessity of striving, along with integration into NATO, for parallel guarantees for our security via the means available—for example, bilateral and regional cooperation, the strongest possible efforts to concurrently improve relations with Germany and Russia, a more active role in the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and so on.

Our endeavor to join NATO creates the impression that we are confusing our security policy ends with the means. If at some time we enter into the alliance, it is necessary to know now what will be next. This cannot be for us the pinnacle of our security efforts, but just the means to actively contribute to a genuinely Pan-European security arrangement (that is, to our maximum security), of which the current NATO is just one—though at the moment, admittedly the most important—element.

Czech Republic: Poles Suggest Joint Production of Skorpions

AU1604190096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Ales Vebr: "The Poles Are Offering Us Participation in Manufacturing the Skorpion Combat Aircraft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The intensification of Czech-Polish cooperation in military aviation could also include collaboration in the production of the Polish Skorpion combat aircraft. The state-controlled Warsaw-based PZL enterprise has been working on its development.

Representatives of the Polish aviation industry referred to this possibility unofficially during a meeting with a group of Czech deputies and reporters in Warsaw last week. Czech officials, however, are not taking this option into consideration.

According to the PZL management, this should involve a 21st-century generation subsonic aircraft oriented toward the destruction of ground targets. The Warsaw-based PZL plant has suspended work on the Skorpion project, however, because of a lack of funds.

The director of the Czech Defense Ministry's purchasing department, Josef Fabian, told PRAVO on 15 April that the Czech Army has no need for such an aircraft. According to some aviation experts, our Air Force would not need the Skorpion as it is planned at the moment. PZL Warsaw Director Ryszard Moscicki said in response to a query from PRAVO on 12 April that the project could be adapted to the needs of the Czech Army. "All modifications are possible," he said. Moscicki added that, although the project grew out of the needs of the Polish Army, the PZL has "the right to do what it wants with it."

PZL Warsaw manufactures, among other things, the PZL 130-Orlik trainer fighter aircraft, which contains a number of Czech components.

According to the reports so far, the Czech Republic is considering buying military aircraft from, among others, the United States and France as a replacement for the obsolete MiG's. The defense and foreign ministers of the two countries agreed over the weekend to establish a commission to coordinate the purchase of military hardware.

Czech Republic: Klaus Discusses Opposition Within Coalition

AU1604125796 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 12 Apr 96 p 3

["Regular" interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "The Merger of Insurance Companies Prevented Their Liquidation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, in the regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, we deal with preelection coalition relations. Other topics are the important issues of the week.

[Krejci] I am aware of your not liking to criticize other people or parties. Nevertheless, in this instance, it is a matter of essential problems. Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], says that no party should have a majority in the possible new coalition government. He claims that 70 percent of the citizens did not vote for the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. If we accept this logic, however, the opposition also would have to be represented in the government. Of course, that is obvious nonsense.

[Klaus] In my opinion, such a thought process cannot be described as logical, and it is impossible to take it seriously and seriously discuss it. The elections are here to express the distribution of votes. If someone obtains a majority, he forms the government. In the instance that there is not such a single party, a government coalition is formed according to the election results. Nonetheless, it really is not worth analyzing in detail.

[Krejci] How do you feel about chairman Lux claiming that it is necessary to curb the power of the ODS?

[Klaus] It is a purpose-oriented, political statement, which one cannot scrutinize ad infinitum.

[Krejci] Some parties are rushing to accept in their ranks various candidates, often of very contrary views, just to gain some votes because of them. In the case of the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS], for instance, it is Dr. Rath. On the other hand, some people are willing to run for any party just to get into the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Petr Pithart, for instance, wants to get into the Senate for the KDU-CSL. What do you think about this peculiar phenomenon?

[Klaus] You made the assessment yourself in your question. These people simply do not have firm, deeply rooted opinions on things around us. Their personal ambitions dramatically dominate, and that is always bad.

[Krejci] Why does the ODS avoid such steps?

[Klaus] Our party certainly is happy to accept new members. New faces are undoubtedly coming, and it certainly is good to hear about people who support us, and we appreciate it very much. Nevertheless, it should not be such a cold, unfeeling, and empty political calculation, as we see in the instances you mentioned.

[Krejci] Do you believe it will bring these parties the results they expect—that is, a gain of some additional votes?

[Klaus] No, I do not have any reason to believe so.

[Krejci] The Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] claims in its election program that it is in favor of a law guaranteeing participation of the employees in the management and ownership of the enterprises. It also supports participation of the trade unions in the decisionmaking process in the firms and an influence of communities on the enterprises based on their territory. This would, in fact, mean expropriation and limitation of ownership rights.

[Klaus] Yes, we had such a system once already, and it was called socialism. I hope that nothing like that will ever be repeated.

[Krejci] The government decided on a merger of the indebted health-insurance companies with those that have their financial matters in order. However, some of them refuse such a merger. How are you going to solve this problem?

[Klaus] The entire issue must be viewed from a certain dynamic vantage point. One possibility is to simply liquidate these insurance companies. We are attempting, however, to execute this process in a softer, and for all the involved parties easier, manner, and that is this attempt at merging the insurance companies. The government defined the conditions, which certainly will cost the taxpayer something.

On the other hand, we do not want and even cannot force the insurance companies, which do not want to merge with anyone, to do so. At a certain stage of the negotiations conducted by the health minister, it seemed that three insurance companies are willing to make this merger maneuver. The status quo is such that one of these companies apparently changed its mind.

[Krejci] Is the government contemplating any other steps in this matter? Will it insist, for instance, that the insurance companies finalize the merger?

[Klaus] This question is a bit premature. We have offered the conditions under which the merger could be accomplished so that the insurance company that takes over the one that is terminated would also benefit. If this plan is not accepted, the standard model of liquidation of a company without any compensation will take place.

[Krejci] How do you feel about the trade unionists intending to enlighten their members before the elections as to for whom they are or are not to vote?

[Klaus] The trade unions are a political organization, however much they are trying to prove that they are not. From this point of view, then, I am not surprised at their step. It probably would be fair if some of them changed their name to a political party.

[Krejci] The Social Democracy allegedly would not support the law and the agreement on the Czech-Slovak border. It allegedly learned that not all things are as Minister Ruml claims. How will the government proceed if this law is not passed?

[Klaus] This question will be meaningful after the parliament deals with it so, or otherwise. I am only troubled by this issue coming only a month before the elections, when the regards for peaceful Czech-Slovak relations will not play such a role in the lifting or not lifting of hands but, rather, a cold calculation by the individual political parties and populist gestures.

Czech Republic: KDU-CSL: Coalition Party With Most Members

AU1704100796 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "ket": "People's Party and Communists Are in the Lead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No political party is organizing activities aimed at recruiting new members. Contrary to the left wing, however, the right-wing parties are, as a rule, leaving the growth of membership completely to chance. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] has the largest membership, and, according to its press spokesman, Vera Zezulkava, its ranks comprise 200,000 members, of which approximately 70 percent are of retirement age. "There are both laborers and businessmen among them," she says. The KSCM recruits members, above all, at meetings or panel discussions. The KSCM collects from its members dues in the amount of 0.5 percent of its net income.

The second-largest party in terms of membership is the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], which associates approximately 80,000 citizens. Most members are between the ages of 18 and 45, and they are mostly men. "It is paradoxical that most of the leadership is of the age that is least represented in the party," party spokesman Jaroslav Orel says. The KDU-CSL does not organize membership campaigns. New members come on their own, attracted by the work of the KDU-CSL. They pay the amount of 150 korunas [Kc] annually to the party.

According to their own claim, the third ranking in terms of membership is the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC]. The staff of the party's secretariat claims a membership of approximately 55,000. It did not release any additional information.

The "Movement of Retired People for Social Security" [HDZJ] allegedly associates about 40,000 members, most of retirement age. The members do not pay dues.

The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] has approximately 22,000 members registered. Its typical member is 35 to 55 years old, with high-school or university education. Approximately one-half are women. The ODS collects Kc200 annually from its members. It does not organize recruiting campaigns, leaving enrollment completely to chance.

It is followed by the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], with 13,221 organized social democrats, who contribute to the party at least Kc20 per year. According to its spokesman, Jiri Kanturek, however, the party does not keep any statistics, so the structure of the membership cannot be established. The CSSD, according to him, organizes various activities—election-campaign meetings, for instance—and uses such opportunities to hand out party-membership applications.

The Bohemian and Moravian Center Union [CMUS] currently has some 10,000 members, mostly from small towns and villages. "We have members also outside Moravia, even in Prague, and eastern and southern Bohemia," party spokesman Simona Svitakova says. "Everything the party does serves, among other things, the recruitment of new members," she adds.

Approximately 8,000 members of an average age of 50 are now associated in the Free Democrats Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS]. Spokesman Hana Hlcnerova believes that new members join individually, attracted by information in the media.

"The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has 6,000 members, according to Secretary Stanislava Zajicova, with an average age of 46. Approximately one-third are women, and 30 percent are university graduates," she claims. The SDL members most often work as teachers, businessmen, and technical staff, and in health care.

The SDL is followed by the Left Bloc, with 3,000 members. "A typical member probably is a high-school graduate between the ages of 40 and 50," chairman Jaroslav Ortman claims. Annual dues are Kc160.

The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] has 2,500 members, according to spokesman David Rozanek, most of whom are high-school or university graduates younger than 40 years. They contribute to party activities with the sum of Kc250 per year. The Civic Democratic Alliance does not organize any activities aimed at an expansion of its membership either.

Party Membership

Party	Number of Members
ODS	22,000
ODA	2,500
KDU-CSL	80,000
CSSD	13,221
KSCM	200,000
SPR-RSC	55,000 (allegedly)
CMUS	10,000
LB	3,500
SDL	6,000
SDZJ	40,000 (allegedly)

Czech Republic: Rift in Association of Entrepreneurs

AU1704111296 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 16 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by "(pas)": "The Entrepreneurs Want To Get Rid of Baranek"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Representatives from the Association of Entrepreneurs have issued a sharp protest against their recent activity being associated mainly with the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS]. According to the Association's three deputy chairmen, its chairman, Rudolf Baranek, is to blame for this.

According to them, particularly connected with this is the fact that the Association's chairman, Rudolf Baranek, is also the chairman of the Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers, which concluded an agreement with the SD-LSNS on taking part in its lists of candidates and, in this context, is to pay more than 8 million korunas for its potential involvement in parliament. The Association's deputy chairmen—Pavel Dvorak, Jaromir Schubert, and Miroslav Valenta—disagree with the activity of their employers union being constantly politicized. They have also described the fact that the Association of Entrepreneurs was recently expelled from the Confederation of Employers Unions as a consequence of this politicization. According to them, Baranek was asked at the Republic board last week to suspend his activity as leader of the Association until the elections are held, while the deputy chairmen would be entrusted with running it. Because this did not happen, the aforementioned deputy chairmen intend to announce their resignation at the regular assembly of delegates that will be held tomorrow.

Czech Republic: 'Czech Party for the Republic' Founded

AU1604190996 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Stehlik Will Go Into the Elections With His Own Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech Party for the Republic (CSR) [Ceska strana republiky], the new political party founded by Vladimir Stehlik, director general of Poldi Ocel Kladno and owner of the Bohemia Art company, has already held talks with three political entities on possible joint entry into this year's parliamentary elections.

This statement was made yesterday by Dana Cihelkova, spokeswoman for Poldi. She did not specify which parties were involved. The CSR was founded on 10 April in Kralupy nad Vltavou. According to Cihelkova, the party will be registered at the Interior Ministry in the next few days. The assembly at which the party's presidium—that is, a chairman and two deputy chairmen—is to be elected will probably be held in about six weeks. The assembly will also approve its articles and policy statement. The spokeswoman said that the party's membership base, according to the most recent estimates, will be extensive.

She did not rule out a union with another political party in order that the CSR might campaign in the elections. According to Cihelkova, the selection of the party involved should be made by the end of the week. The party's main orientation, according to her, is support for industry and agriculture.

Slovakia: Chances of NATO Membership Seen Deteriorating

AU1704144896 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak
17 Apr 96 p 7

[Commentary by Luba Nitrova: "NATO's Foresight a Bitter Pill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a recent conference in the United States, Lady Margaret Thatcher spoke about her concern over the reduction in the level of the West's security in the midst of the threat of nuclear arms proliferation. The present flashpoints of tension in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union are confronting politicians with the need to come to terms with the problems of nationalism, ethnic tensions, religious fanaticism, and the emergence of new nation states in the wake of the Cold War period. The West is forced to reassess its security structures in light of the changing relations with East Europe and the Balkans.

In the discussion at the above conference, Branislav Lichardus, ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States, said that Slovakia's aim was full-fledged NATO and EU membership. "Have patience with us. We have existed for only three years, but we are on the right road to democracy," the Slovak diplomat appealed. It seems, however, that his words did not fall on fertile soil. In the last version of the bill on NATO expansion prepared by the U.S. Congress, Slovakia dropped out as a potential member of NATO. According to information of Laszlo Gyurovszky, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party, the conservative majority in the U.S. Congress is of the opinion that Slovakia does not meet the criteria required to join NATO. This change of opinion was partially heralded by the demarches addressed to Slovakia last fall, in which the EU and the United States expressed concern over the situation in Slovakia, marked by tensions between the main institutions of the state, and over Bratislava not abiding by the norms required for NATO entry.

East Europe is everything but united on the issue of joining NATO. General Dumitru Cioflina, chief of the Romanian Army General Staff, for example, is contemplating the renewal of a military alliance around Russia as an opposite pole to NATO. Is this fear of NATO, which is not rushing to open its doors, or a signal of a fundamental disagreement between officers and politicians in Bucharest, sent out at a time when Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, during his visit to Moscow, strove to explain why the admission of Poland into NATO would not threaten Russia in any way?

For one group of countries, such as Poland, for example, there simply exists no other goal but entry into NATO and the EU. The second group is made up of countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, for which the temptation to the turn again to the former "big brother," as a compensation for the West's lack of interest in them, remains strong. But this temptation is not to be found just in these two countries....

Our southern neighbor—Hungary—is supposedly trailing behind with regard to integration into NATO because there are doubts over Slovakia's entry into the organization, as a result of which there would be no "geographic continuity" between the alliance and Hungary. To the northwest of us, the situation is different. Tomorrow the Czech Republic expects to be delivered a questionnaire on the Czech Republic's EU application. All countries whose admission into NATO is being reckoned with ought to receive this questionnaire, one by one. That this will not be a mere formality is confirmed also by the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's "extended arm tour" across Europe. He has just visited Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, where he conferred with President Algirdas Brazauskas, first and foremost, on Lithuania's desire to become a NATO member state.

The situation regarding NATO's expansion eastward definitely is not as crystal-clear as it seemed to be only a year ago. This fact, too, confirms that NATO does not intend to heed only the reassuring words of candidates for admission, but that it attentively studies and analyzes the true state of affairs in individual states. One can only praise such a foresighted approach, even if its outcome could be a bitter pill for Slovakia....

Slovakia: Kovac Comments on Visit to Kyrgyzstan

AU1604173796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
16 Apr 96 pp 1, 13

[Article by Ivan Drabek: "Michal Kovac in Kyrgyzstan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Michal Kovac yesterday concluded the historic first official visit to China, and shortly before midnight local time arrived in Bishkek. He was met in the capital of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan by President Askar Akayev. Kovac will end the week-long visit to the Far East and Central Asia today, and return home in the evening.

Yesterday morning, Kovac visited the special economic zone in Shenzhen in southern China, visited the Ricoh enterprise manufacturing copy equipment, and planted a tree in the Park of Beautiful China. Prior to the official parting from Beijing, Kovac acknowledged that during his visit the interest in making Sino-Slovak relations more dynamic in the economic, cultural, and scientific spheres was confirmed on the supreme level, and opportunities for cooperation were also observed in the international-diplomatic field, where both parties hold identical or similar views.

The meetings in Beijing, Xian, and Shenzhen will, according to the president, increase the level of information about each other, which creates the conditions for concluding new contracts. He described an offer by the Chinese party to take part in the development of the less developed provinces in the PRC as an opportunity for Slovak manufacturers of road and transport equipment. Kovac observed that during the talks with the Chinese representatives he abstained from criticizing the standard of the observation of human rights, but he stressed to President Jiang Zemin that the efforts to deal with the social and economic status of the citizens cannot countervene the protection of human rights.

At PRAVDA's request, Kovac also commented on Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's statement last week, when he reproached the president regarding the visit to the PRC because he does not coordinate his travel with the Slovak Foreign Ministry, which cannot prepare them properly as a result. The president pointed out that the invitation to China for the president came as long ago as in 1994. The trip had been prepared since May last year for October or November 1995. Since the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic visited the PRC last fall, it would not have been appropriate, according to Kovac, for another state visit to follow immediately. The Office of the President, in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry, therefore sought the best suitable date, the president observed. According to him, the error was probably caused by a dearth of information on the part of the prime minister. "I would have personally briefed the prime minister about this trip in detail, had he accepted my invitation for talks in February," the president added. Since his travel is prepared in close cooperation with the Foreign Ministry, he does not even intend to inform the prime minister in writing about his travel in the future.

Brigita Schmognerova, who is one of the five opposition deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic accompanying the president in the PRC and Kyrgyzstan, told PRAVDA that the significance of the visit was significantly reduced by the unwillingness of the government to delegate several high-ranking officials, who should have been a part of the president's retinue. "If the economy and foreign ministers took part, some of the more important Slovak businessmen would have joined in, and it would have certainly been reflected in a better contribution to the development of Sino-Slovak relations," Schmognerova said.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 April in a similar report adds: "To the NARODNA OBRODA question concerning his reaction to the accusations by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar that the president does not coordinate his world travel with the Foreign Ministry, and that the trip to the PRC is a holiday excursion, he said verbatim: 'These are meeting talks, which really do not deserve much attention, and correspondingly, they are not even picked up much by media at home. I could also say that the prime minister and the parliament chairman make holiday excursions. Those who were here saw that the talks with the Chinese officials were no excursion. If a high-ranking official learned that a constitutional official from my homeland evaluated the visit in this manner, he could get offended, for this means defaming not only his person but the state, too.'"]

Slovakia: Meciar Speaks at Nuclear Power Station Ceremony

LD1604133196 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar attended the signing of the agreement to complete the construction of the Mochovce nuclear power station. The ceremony took place at the Forum Hotel in Bratislava this morning. The agreement signing follows the government resolution and the conclusions reached by the contractors at their meeting in September last year. Bibiana Gunisova reports:

[Gunisova] I would like to remind you that in 1990 the construction of the Mochovce nuclear power station was put on hold—with the exception of work on the control room—because of financial problems.

By signing the agreements today, major suppliers confirmed their obligation to complete the first and the second block of the Mochovce nuclear power station by the deadlines, and to meet appropriate nuclear safety norms in accordance with the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the risk factor.

The Nuclear Inspection Office of the Slovak Republic will be the guarantor of safe operation at the Mochovce nuclear power station. This state inspection body will be the only body entitled to approve the commissioning of the Mochovce nuclear power station. The first block is to be operational in July 1998 and the second block in March 1999. [passage omitted]

The importance of today's step is highlighted by the presence of the ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary from the four countries participating in the completion of the Mochovce construction—Germany, the Czech Republic, France, and the Russian Federation.

About 20 members of environment movements gathered in front of the Forum Hotel before 1030 this morning. They were wearing gas masks and held protest banners.

In his opening address, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar spoke about Slovak nuclear safety. He said, among other things, that Slovakia has meticulously observed the safety of nuclear operations, and that the Slovak energy program is based on the latest scientific knowledge. He went on to say:

[Begin Meciar recording] After having assessed all the available options, we are now launching a project which symbolizes a new type of international cooperation between countries which have so far failed to cooperate in this field. [passage omitted]

The Slovak Republic's nuclear program will continue with completion of the Mochovce third and fourth blocks. After that, the Slovak Republic will not develop its nuclear program any further. [passage omitted]

We trust the technical knowledge of renowned companies such as Siemens, Framatome, and Electricite de France. We trust Russian companies. We trust our Czech suppliers. We trust the IAEA experts who say that it is possible to use nuclear energy while securing ecologically acceptable conditions and high rentability. For the time being, there are in our situation no alternatives to this method.

Trusting them, the Slovak Government decided to support this project and to guarantee its completion. At present, the overall investment is expected to reach 26 billion Slovak korunnas for the first two blocks. The work on the third and the fourth block will then follow. [end recording]

Slovakia: Official Defends Provisions of Media Bill

AU1604130796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 15 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Secik, general director of the Public Information Section at the Slovak Ministry of Culture, by Marcela Kostalova; place and date not given: "Foundation—Mass Media Freedom"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kostalova] The main objections to articles [of the media bill] on the registration of the periodical press concern the fact that the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, as the state administration body tasked with this duty, will obtain too much information of confidential nature. Certain provisions of the bill also restrict the development of the free media market.

[Secik] I disagree because analogous information on an even larger scale is required in the majority of advanced West European countries. On the basis of their experience, it is possible to say that an unregulated market for public information media leads to concentration and monopolization and poses a direct threat to media freedom, independence, and plurality. This is why, in conformity with Council of Europe Recommendation No. (94) 13, addressed by the Committee of Ministers to member states regarding measures in support of media transparency, the provision was incorporated into the bill on a 20 percent limit on intermedia (so-called cross) ownership. This means, for example, that the owner of a daily with nationwide distribution must not have a stake in excess of 20 percent in the commercial property of a corporation that operates radio or television broadcasts that can be received on the entire territory of Slovakia, or that operates a news agency.

[Kostalova] Why is it the prerogative of the Ministry of Culture to impose fines for breaches of the media law? Should this not be the duty of courts?

[Secik] I would like to point out that the fines that the ministry has a right to impose, according to the draft of the law, will concern mostly violations of the duties of the publisher of periodical press—the duty, for example, to denote in every issue the prescribed data (publication information bloc), to annually publish data on the proprietary structure, to designate advertisements as such, to report to the registering agency changes of relevant data, the duty, furthermore, to abide by the aforementioned 20 percent maximum property share, or cases of breaches of the obligation of the press to publish, at the request of state agencies and communities, pressing announcements in public interest. Possible libel cases or disputes over the enforcement of the right to the publication of a correction, response, or additional announcement will be dealt with by courts, as is explicitly stated in the draft. Let me say one more thing on the issue of fines. As a rule, their imposition can be considered only if, despite warnings, the publisher failed to eliminate ascertained shortcomings. In deciding on the sum of the fine, consideration should be given to the seriousness, duration, and consequences of the unlawful conduct as well as to the economic situation of the publisher of periodical press.

Slovakia: Critics of Constitutional Amendment Denounced

AU1604131096 Bratislava NOVA SMENA MLADYCH in Slovak 12 Apr 96 p 3

[Editorial by Miroslav Svicky under the "Commentary" rubric]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist International (SI) is concerned over the policy of the Slovak Government and would not like to welcome the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in its ranks, which does not apply to Weiss's supporters. The first joke is that the HZDS never sent any application to the SI. The second joke is that, when the SI does not consider the Slovak Republic to be socialist enough, it is more of an honor than a disaster. Why should the Visegrad Four be considered as a 3 plus 1, according to our socialist internationalists, when Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky, for example, does not see it that way and would like to see Slovakia in the first group of countries accepted into the EU? Slovakia is neither more nor less socialist or right-wing than the Czech Republic, for example. If the SI prefers those parties that have more postcommunists in their ranks, it is pointless to deal with it.

It would make more sense to deal with the link between the will of the citizens of our state and the desire to make Slovakia join the Pan-European superstate. Has the majority of the population of Slovakia perhaps expressed the will to become part of United Western Central Europe? No. So why has it become a matter of course? Why is the subject "The European Union" being introduced at universities?! Just because it is fashionable? Yet the principles embedded in our Constitution are not fashionable but, rather, democratic. Fashionable is something else—for example, to enshrine one thing in the Constitution and to realize something else in everyday life.

For instance, when we enshrine protection of the Republic in the Constitution, which is our right, no internationals have the right to meddle in this. Provided, of course, that we did so democratically. We are now surprised that someone is constantly meddling, nonetheless. First and foremost, it is not "someone," but specific persons from specific circles. More precisely, from Pan-European circles and from the world-ruling circles from the "White House." As these circles are interested in the establishment of a single European state with a uniform economy, they actually want to destroy the sovereignty of existing states, that is, they want to liquidate them, in fact.

This is the simple reason for the protection of our Republic being a thorn in their flesh.

Hungary: Poll Shows Drop in Torgyan's Popularity

AU1604155696 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Bela Marian: "Torgyan's Popularity Has Plunged, Government Members' Has Increased"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Marketing Center's latest survey—prepared at the beginning of April—some 78 percent of citizens were aware that extremist incidents had disturbed the 15 March national day. Most people link these events to [Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP Chairman] Jozsef Torgyan and the FKGP. Barely a third as many people found the role of Istvan Csurka [chairman of Hungarian Justice and Life Party] and Albert Szabo [extreme right wing leader] worth mentioning as they did the FKGP's "Farewell to the Government" rally, which had been announced well in advance. At any rate, the event had exactly the opposite effect on the public than what had been hoped for by its organizers: The public's support for the FKGP decreased by 6 percent. Torgyan's confidence index dropped 10 points. At the same time, current public opinion in favor of the government has not been this good since January 1995, and the confidence index of all government politicians has increased. In the cases of Gyula Horn, [Defense Minister] Gyorgy Keleti, Laszlo Kovacs, and [Education and Culture Minister] Balint Magyar, the improvement is bigger than the error margin. Naturally, this can only be linked to the FKGP's antigovernment demonstration to the extent that, in light of its extremist tone, moderate politicians who do not much divide people with various party affiliations have gained favor in the public's view.

The government reshuffle early this year proved definitely successful, although the recognition index and popularity of [Labor Minister] Peter Kiss do not even come close to that of Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa. (At the moment, some 44 percent of the public believe they have heard the new labor minister's name, and his confidence index stands at 38 points.) At the same time [Finance Minister] Peter Medgyessy and Balint Magyar are among the government's most popular members. Both took the first hurdles well. Although both the finance and the cultural ministries are in a crossfire of debates, their popularity has increased. In particular, the opinions on Magyar have improved considerably since his appointment. Some 800,000 people have learned his name since January and, parallel to this, his confidence index increased from 43 to 54 points. Magyar's popularity increased mainly among people interested in politics, with a good level of education, and in higher income brackets. At the same time, out of the 25 politicians in our table, only his and Mrs. Kosa's confidence indexes are higher among women than among men.

It seems that it is much more important for the public that Hungary has been accepted into the OECD, the organization of most developed countries, than the fact that the opposition sharply criticized the government's foreign policy in connection with the Slovak addendum to the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty, because Laszlo Kovacs's confidence index also grew by four points. At the same time, Kovacs is still among the less well known government members, which is surprising because due to his office, he is one of the most frequently shown politicians in the media. The reason for being relatively less well known is that the general public is less interested in foreign policy than in domestic affairs, and no sensation or scandal is attached to Kovacs's name. For example, Geza Jeszenszky became generally known in connection with the well-known Kalashnikov affair.

Torgyan's confidence index has been higher than that of the prime minister since April 1995. Horn was very popular before and after the 1994 elections for quite a few months, in spite of the strong campaign against him (or partly due to it). However, when it became clear that the Horn government cannot raise the living standards either, his popularity very quickly began to fade. He reached the lowest point after the Bokros package, and has not really been able to move off from this level until now.

From the first day of the reelected parliament Torgyan has been criticizing the government, the government parties, and personally the prime minister very vehemently. In one or two months he became the opposition's tone setter and, in the meantime, his confidence index improved by 17 points. It is no accident that Torgyan's popularity mainly increased among the poorest people, while the prime minister's dropped the most among them. However, the tables seem now to have been turned, although Torgyan is still more popular among the poorest than among the richest, among whom his rejection has become virtually general by now.

We have indicated a number of times in the past that the assessment of most politicians is worse in Budapest than in the provinces. At the same time, Budapest dwellers reacted more sharply to the March events than people in the provinces did. A reason might be that people in Budapest were able to see the events with their own eyes. At any rate, Torgyan's confidence index suffered the biggest drop precisely among Budapest's population, and this is also where Horn's confidence index increased the most.

Popularity of Politicians (in percent)

	Confidence	Recognition	Change
Goncz	74	99	3
Demszky	58	94	0
Kuncze	57	96	2
Medgyessy	57	91	2
Keleti	57	87	4
Kovacs	57	68	4
Magyar	54	78	4
Orban	50	94	1
Deutsch	50	86	0
Gal	49	81	3
Vastagh	48	71	1
Peto	47	94	2
Surjan	46	88	3
Lotz	45	72	0
Szekeres	42	76	3
Giczy	42	69	1
Hron	40	99	5
Suchman	39	76	0
Szabo	37	84	0
Lezsak	37	82	1
Maczo	36	85	- 1
Torgyan	30	99	- 10
Boross	29	92	1
Bokros	19	99	0
Csurka	17	91	- 1

Whom would you welcome in the prime minister's chair?

	Percent
Horn	13
Nemeth	10
Torgyan	7
Kuncze	5
Orban	4
Others	15
Do not know	46

Horn's and Torgyan's Confidence Index

	Horn	Torgyan
Oct 94	64	27
Nov 94	58	33
Dec 94	54	40
Jan 95	54	45
Feb 95	47	38
Mar 95	50	37
Apr 95	41	43
May 95	42	41
Jun 95	33	42
Jul 95	32	39
Aug 95	36	40
Sep 95	32	39
Oct 95	31	39
Nov 95	30	41
Dec 95	33	38
Jan 96	34	43
Feb 96	33	41
Mar 96	35	40
Apr 96	40	29

Change in Torgyan's and Horn's Confidence Index According to Dwelling Place and Income

	Torgyan		Horn	
	Mar	Apr	Mar	Apr
Budapest	38	21	26	38
County seats	28	29	41	36
Other towns	38	29	37	42
Villages	48	34	37	42
Income				
—Lowest 20 percent	54	43	27	37
—Lower middle	40	30	31	44
—Middle	42	31	39	41
—Upper middle	37	30	41	44
—Highest 20 percent	31	17	42	43
Respondents	40	30	35	40

Hungary: Party Official on Trouble Signs in MDF

96CH0050A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 30 Jan 96 pp 15-16

[Interview with Imre Konya by Attila Bujak; place and date not given: "Is the Ship Sinking? Alarm Signals From the MDF"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *They say that the party is going to split. They say that the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] is going to revive. Some people also say that [the party] should return to the beginnings, under the Lakitelek tent where the change of regime was launched. No more word was said in Godollo about Antall's CDU-like, center-right, integrating party. But Pozsgay's group have dissolved everything around themselves.... And they repeatedly mentioned a new Lakitelek beginning. In what direction is the largest parliamentary party of the opposition heading? Imre Konya, representing one of the sides, provided some answers. The interview was conducted by Attila Bujak.*

[Bujak] I have seen recently a popular book on economics in a bookstore, which had the following subtitle: "The Rapid Growth, Development, and Failure of Companies...." I was thinking of this title on my way to you. Is it possible that the MDF, too, reached its peak too suddenly in 1990? Is it possible that this sudden growth was harmful?

[Konya] The parties that won the first elections and brought about a change of regime lost the second elections in other countries, too. However, this should not be considered a defeat—and, for this, too, there are plenty of examples in this region. In former Czechoslovakia and former East Germany, the formations that played the role of a howitzer in the change of regime disappeared almost immediately without a trace. On the other hand, the MDF-led coalition governed through the first parliamentary cycle; incidentally, it was the only one in the region to do so. Of course, in spite of this, losing the elections was a setback, perhaps a few percentage points larger than what was unavoidable. In addition to the mistakes, Jozsef Antall's death—a tragic circumstance—also played a role in this.

[Bujak] Do you feel a significant difference between Antall and Boross?

[Konya] No one should be subject to a comparison with Jozsef Antall. I feel nevertheless that Jozsef Antall's death resulted in a change in style and, to a certain extent, in the political line. The voters may also have felt this. Our campaign was not very successful either. But, I repeat, all this could only mean a few percentage points on the minus side. In essence, the MDF was defeated in 1994 because it carried out most of what it had promised in 1990. It changed the political system, causing temporary difficulties in many people's lives.

In Opposition, Without Success

[Bujak] It is perhaps your party's past in organizational activities which it was unable to synthesize. The members still carry this dichotomy. They have a nostalgia for the happy times that followed Lezsak's tent pitching. As a consequence, they do not care for those politicians who they think rose to positions by stepping on their shoulders, and have embarked on a road of very traditional political careers. A lawyer who becomes minister of the interior.... This is a normal career in the West. Perhaps the MDF membership does not see it this way.

[Konya] This may appear so from the outside, but the contrary is true. The series of attacks against us, which are sometimes unjust and which everyone who assumes a political role in a democracy must endure, rather elicited an affinity in the members, for they themselves were in the position of being attacked in their own environment. I, for instance, felt the strongest support when a personal attack was launched against me in connection with the so-called Konya article.

[Bujak] On the other hand, I can quote Miklos Csapody, who said that "the Konya followers destroy the party, ignore party decisions, and could care less if the MDF's popularity is decreasing in the meantime."

[Konya] One must differentiate between the membership's mood and deliberate statements of certain leading officials.

[Bujak] The MDF's popularity has not increased since it has been in opposition. What is the explanation for this lack of success? One would think that nothing is more popular than being in opposition, nothing is more rewarding in Hungary today than opposing the Bokros package.

[Konya] Well, our stand against the Bokros package—especially in view of the Constitutional Court's decisions—did indeed affect public opinion. Of course, when people's attention is diverted by slanderous statements, there is no reason for an increase in popularity. The media are always more interested in internal personal disputes than in any real accomplishments. They hardly increase the party's popularity.

[Bujak] Of course, there is also a psychological reason for the internal disputes. I think this party has become too small for the former national leaders. Those who used to feel the weight of government responsibility are now wandering about in various offices like ghosts, and are perhaps a little bored. Here they sit in a small party whose importance in Hungarian politics is gradually dwindling.

[Konya] For that matter, we do not have time to be bored even in the opposition. And the fact that there are many experienced politicians in this party is a great advantage and is reflected in our work in parliament. In a democracy, a party is sometimes in government, sometimes in opposition. This is entirely normal. Much experience can be gained even in the opposition, which will help us do a better job in governing the next time.

The Chief Liberal Evil

[Bujak] One can hear strange things about you nowadays. For instance, that you have become the chief of liberal chiefs in the party.

[Konya] Well, yes. Since the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], our adversary, declared itself liberal during those times, the term "liberal" was not very popular in the MDF. For this reason, if someone wanted to attack someone else in the party, all he had to do was to brand him liberal. For instance, no one thought of calling Ivan Szabo a liberal during the past cycle. He was considered a prominent member of the MDF's Christian Democratic Circle. And then, when he won the support of most of the membership at the last national convention, he immediately became a "liberal." This is how some people wanted to make him appear as an SZDSZ agent. I, too, have been recently included among the "liberals" by some people. No one did this earlier. Incidentally, liberalism is included in every democratic party's value system, therefore it is somewhat anachronistic when at the end of the 20th century a party calls itself liberal. Probably the SZDSZ, too, did this in 1989 in order to disguise its leftist orientation. I cannot accept the simplifying term "radical" either, which has been most recently "offered" to Peter Boross. Boross is not a radical politician at all. Incidentally, I think Torgyan is not either, he may just be a demagogue. I call anyone radical who always chooses the most consistent solution to reach his goals. In this sense, Jozsef Antall, for instance, was a radical politician.

[Bujak] This issue can be checked off. Did you really make a mistake in the issue of the civic alliance?

[Konya] Yes. The MDF should have been much more decisive in urging for a three-party cooperation. It did so in the beginning but became indecisive after the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] chairman's election. In opposition to our chairman's proposal, which unequivocally supported the idea of a three-party alliance, Peter Boross's proposal, which was much less decisive with regard to this issue, was accepted at the national convention.

[Bujak] Everything you have said clearly indicates that you will not make an alliance with Torgyan. Incidentally, this is in the spirit of the former prime minister who would have never shaken hands with Torgyan.

[Konya] And it is in agreement with Lajos Fur's view as well, for he designated the position of our party between the left wing and Torgyan's demagogy. There is no path that leads to Torgyan, and there is no path that leads to the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] or the SZDSZ either.

The Song of Those Who Left

[Bujak] Do the people of Godollo also concur with this? Chairmanship nominee Lezsak's program speech was rather enigmatic. He spoke of those "who left," not even mentioning Antall. On the other hand, Csaba Gy. Kiss appears on the scene, and Pozsgay's National Alliance is about to be dissolved. Zoltan Biro states that he could conceivably be involved in politics within a "tidied-up" MDF.

[Konya] There is no return to the pre-Antall times. And Jozsef Antall cannot be excluded from the MDF's growth. The MDF must proceed on the path specified by him. Although we cannot yet speak in every respect of a CDU-like center-right party that Jozsef Antall dreamed about, we have a good chance. Such a political force may be an alternative to the present coalition.

[Bujak] Only a CSU and an FDP must be produced.... But they do already exist, do they not?

[Konya] I wish things were that simple!

[Bujak] One imagines that if you win now, you will lose the party but the possibility of a dialogue with society will remain. If Lezsak's group wins in March, they will "occupy" and run the party but society will distance itself from the MDF.

[Konya] I am sure that an MDF lead by a person like Lajos Fur or even Ivan Szabo will remain a unified party. Jozsef Antall's political legacy is generally accepted by the MDF membership.

[Bujak] Could it happen in 1998 that the MDF becomes history, disappearing in the past as one of the interesting episodes of the change of regime? Is it possible that in March the party will split in two?

[Konya] Not as long as it adheres to the Antallian values. The MDF played a historical role when it rallied the forces that were ready for a change and subsequently directed the change of regime for four years. Today it is still capable of playing a role against the left wing, akin to that of European center-right formations. The fact that it still enjoys the support of most of the patriotic conservative intelligentsia is am assurance for survival. I will not deny that we are at present in a difficult situation. Important things are being decided. We may end up in a dead-end street if we try to revive the past.

[Bujak] So, is it possible that the MDF will split in two?

[Konya] We have repeatedly been in a situation when people said, that is the end. And we have always survived these critical situations.

[Bujak] Now you are in the middle of a forceful campaign. The telephone lines are on fire.

[Konya] There is no other way to do it, the members of the MDF must learn what is at stake. And, after all, they are the ones with whom we must discuss these matters. For people are not interested what goes on within the MDF. Still, I believe that matters that are important for society as a whole will be decided at our national convention in March.

Hungary: Police Chief Comments on New Investigating Office

LD1604210096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The commander of Budapest Police Headquarters (Janos Bodracska) believes that the new investigating office within the Prime Minister's Office is intended to be established for political reasons.

Janos Bodracska told ESTI HIRLAP that the Constitution would have to be amended for this because the present Constitution only approves the police and the prosecutors' offices as investigating authorities.

The chairman of the relevant committee of the Budapest Municipal Authority (Akos Rostas) also expressed an opinion against the plan. According to his statement forwarded to our editorial desk, Akos Rostas considers the establishment of a new investigating authority professionally unfounded and unjustified.

B-H: Arab States Pledge Funds for Federation Army

LD1604211896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnia-Herzegovina will not only receive financial aid for the reconstruction of devastated property, but also for building a modern army. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have decided to invest money in a training and armament program of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. This decision was adopted at the end of a three-day visit by a Bosnia-Herzegovina and U.S. delegation to these Middle East countries yesterday.

They pledged support to the tune of $100 million and are also ready to send further donations in weapons and equipment. The visit was carried out at the request of the United States. The delegation was led by special envoys of the two presidents—Muhamed Sacirbegovic and [name indistinct]. Envera Selimovic has a report:

[Selimovic] The equip-and-train program by which the military balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be struck features high on the list of priorities of the U.S. Administration.

The joint delegation of the United States and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait was organized at Washington's initiative and is an indisputable confirmation [sentence as heard]. The program is of extreme importance for the United States, President Clinton said in his letter to the hosts. [passage omitted]

B-H: Civilian Reconstruction Aid Promises Detailed

BR1604135096 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 16 Apr 96 p 18

[Unattributed report: "New Money for Bosnia-Herzegovina"—all currency in Danish kroner]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the first international aid conference in December 1995, 3.4 billion was promised, of which only a small percentage has so far been turned into concrete projects.

During the weekend, the following additional sums were promised for civilian reconstruction this year (the figures do not include emergency aid or the cost of military peacekeeping operations).

Promised Sums for Civilian Reconstruction (in Danish kroner)

EU budget	1.5 billion
EU countries, in total	Over 900 million
Including	
—Denmark	25 million
—Sweden	70 million
—Finland	17 million
—The Netherlands	285 million
—Germany	20 million
—Great Britain	75 million
—Italy	285 million
—Spain	90 million
—Greece	40 million
United States	1.2 billion
Japan	740 million
Canada	105 million
Norway	140 million
Iceland	9 million
Muslim countries	950 million
Other donor countries (no information on breakdown)	950 million
International Organizations and Funds	
—EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)	400 million
—World Bank	1 billion
—Islamic Development Fund	140 million
—Other Organizations	75 million
Total	Approximately 7.3 billion

NOTE: These figures are only approximate because many countries have been unwilling to make public the exact extent of their aid.

Sources: World Bank, the EU Commission, and national delegations

B-H: Bildt Stresses 'Multiethnic' State as Goal

AU1604123496 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 14 Apr 96 p 31

[Commentary by Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina: "We Must Offer a Carrot for Peace, but We Must Also Brandish the Stick"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The vision of a common multiethnic Bosnian state as envisaged in the Dayton accord can be implemented, but it requires two things: First, the will of the people in Bosnia themselves, and second, a firm desire by the international community to discharge its obligations.

It is mainly the political leaders on all sides in this fragmented Bosnia who are responsible for the difficulties now facing us. But we must not underestimate the important role which we ourselves can play by, on the one hand, offering the carrot and, on the other hand, showing that we are prepared to use the stick if necessary.

Our most effective stick, the strict military implementation of peace, has proved effective so far, more effective even than we expected.

As a result of the overwhelming display of NATO strength, there are only a few challenges that the international force in Bosnia has not been able to tackle easily. Thanks to the professionalism of IFOR [Implementation Force] commander Admiral Leighton Smith and the international force under his command (29,000 troops from the EU countries, 18,000 from the United States, and about 10,000 from non-EU countries, including Russia), a unique NATO operation is taking place that must succeed.

But when we look ahead, our gaze will settle on the civilian aspect of the peace operation. And this involves greater effort. If the international force quits Bosnia at the end of the year as planned and if the people in Bosnia really want to forge a common future, then certain conditions have to be met.

The Bosnian contracting parties must fulfill all the provisions of Dayton to the letter. So far, they have all acted contrary to its provisions in certain spheres, for example, there has been a delay in releasing prisoners of war and there has been no cooperation with the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, especially concerning the extradition of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his general Ratko Mladic. There can be no compromise on these matters.

The international community must render all the economic aid that was agreed upon at the Brussels conference in December. We are 33 percent in arrears in implementing the $1.2-billion EU and World Bank credit program. But, unless we satisfy Bosnia's short-term needs, I see little chance of safeguarding the country's long-term future.

We are heading toward elections in Bosnia at the end of the year, which will give Bosnia the opportunity to articulate itself in a democratic way. We must support this process with financial means and know-how. There is still a shortage of both. On their part, the politicians in Bosnia on both sides of the demarcation line must finally find a language of peace and abandon their rhetoric of violence.

The media are going to assume an even more important role in this critical period. I myself am going to cooperate closely with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], which will monitor the media. That should make sure that all parties have equal access to the media. Right now we are working on a catalogue of rules governing dealings with the media and we encourage external financial support for independent media within Bosnia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia in ethnic conflicts and hysteria has a lot to do with biased and manipulated reporting in the local media. Now the media must also play their part in the consolidation of peace.

As for diplomacy, we must make sure that the stage is not occupied by too many players. It is good to meet at intervals in order to remind the opposing parties of their obligations. But experience has taught us that these parties are masters of the art of pretending to be diplomats with one another. We have experienced this all too often in the war and have also witnessed it in Mostar and Sarajevo over the past few months. In diplomacy, we must present a united front.

Finally, we must not lose sight of our goal of achieving a united and multiethnic Bosnia. That also means we must not create the impression that we listen to suggestions whereby a strict partition of the country is the best way out of the dilemma. Priority must go to establishing peace and from peace everything else will emanate.

The opposing parties must know that the eyes of the world are on them. Bosnia is the most divided society there ever was. Bringing peace to this society will be a Herculean task.

And yet the struggle for peace is [?worth—word indistinct] every effort, for the alternative can only be more [?bloodshed].

B-H: Spokesman: 'Too Early' for Statement on NATO Mandate

AU1604131796 Paris AFP in English 1306 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 16 (AFP)—It is "too early" for NATO leaders to announce whether the NATO-led Implementation Force will stay in Bosnia after the end of its one-year mandate, a senior NATO officer said here Tuesday.

It is "too early to say if there will be a requirement to extend the mission or (if) there will be no requirement," British Brigadier Andrew Cumming said.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana told a meeting of NATO ambassadors in Brussels in February that withdrawal of IFOR troops should not be discussed until mid-April when all the former warring parties are supposed to have demobilised reserve troops, moved other regular troops into barracks and stored away their heavy weapons.

An announcement on whether or not the parties have complied with the demands will be made early next week, Cumming said.

The possible extension of NATO's mandate in Bosnia is a controversial and politically sensitive issue, both here and in the troops' home countries—most notably in Washington during election year.

Officially NATO is sticking for now to its formula that it has a one-year mandate in Bosnia, ending in mid-December, but NATO's supreme commander in Europe, U.S. General George Joulwan, hinted in an interview with an Italian newspaper published Monday that the alliance could extend its stay in the country.

An international conference will be held in mid-June in Florence, Italy, to review progress in the peace process. So far the separation of military forces has proceeded well but political progress has been slower.

The next major stage in the process in Bosnia comes in June when a commission headed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declares whether conditions have been met for elections to be held in Bosnia.

NATO officials are worried that unless the elections go ahead as planned, it will be difficult for them to leave Bosnia, and so far signs for the elections have not been encouraging.

Asked if NATO was seriously considering an extension of its mandate in Bosnia, Joulwan told CORRIERE DELLA SERA on Monday: "Certainly, we are currently thinking about it."

B-H: OSCE Negotiator Advocates Prolonging IFOR Mandate

AU1604130696 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 16 Apr 96 p 4

[APA report: "For a Longer IFOR Mandate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—On 15 April, on the sidelines of a symposium at the University of Vienna, Vigleik Eide, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] disarmament negotiations on ex-Yugoslavia, advocated prolonging the mandate of the Bosnian peace troop [IFOR, Implementation Force], which is limited to 1996. The Norwegian general expects a regional arms control treaty according to the Dayton agreement to be concluded in due time by 6 June. According to Hannes Swoboda, city councilor for foreign affairs, Vienna wants to establish a "school of tolerance" in Sarajevo together with other European cities.

B-H: Gen Delic Addresses Army Day Celebration

AU1604193196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 16 Apr 96

[Speech by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, at the celebration of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Day in Sarajevo—live]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Gentlemen, members of the Presidency, esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen! Esteemed soldiers, it is my honor to greet you [word indistinct] and thank you for attending this ceremony.

[Word indistinct] fallen soldiers binds me to ask you that we pay tribute to the sons of Bosnia-Herzegovina who, for its freedom, [words indistinct] with a prayer [ucenje fatihe] and a minute of silence. [silence] May they rest in peace! [vijecan im rahmet].

In the four-year war for the defense and liberation of Bosna-Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army bore a major burden in the armed resistance to the plan for Bosnia's destruction as a society and a state. The main objective of the long-planned and long-prepared war and aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina was the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the biological extinction of primarily the Bosniaks, but also other non-Serbian peoples, as well as the erasure of all traces of their existence on these territories. The military and paramilitary formations of Serbia and Montenegro were also involved in the preparation, planning, and realization of the aggression, while all the civilian structures of these countries and the powerful international diplomatic apparatus that they had inherited from the former Socialist Federatal Republic of Yugoslavia were engaged in propaganda and financial and diplomatic support for the realization of this aggression. The aggression against Bosnia was intended to round up the borders of the rump Yugoslavia, that is, the Greater Serbia, with the political goal of retaining the Serbian hegemony on all territories of the former Yugoslavia where there was a Serbian population, even if it was in an absolute minority. Apart from the paramilitary formations of the Serbian Democratic Party, some 80,000 soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro, with the regular logistical and all other assistance of these countries, also took part in various stages of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. The efforts of our country's political leadership to avert the war by political means, as well as a series of compromise proposals on Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal setup and its equal openness toward Serbia and Croatia alike, were thwarted by the ultimative and [word indistinct] of the Greater Serbian [word indistinct]. When war was deemed unavoidable, despite all the political efforts and initiatives, the military organization for the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina started within the Party of Democratic Action. Such a decision was dictated by the paradoxical situation whereby those whose primarily political task was the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a political and geographical entity decided on our country's defense tasks. The organization of our country's defense thus started in the very difficult circumstances of strategic encirclement, illegal work, and the subsequently imposed arms embargo. However, the thus formed and poorly armed units of the Patriotic League, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other patriotic forces managed to put up resistance and secure the further organization of our country's defense as the country's priority task. The international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by a great number of countries in the world had a great impact on our political and military strengthening—70 countries recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 1992. With this, we won a major political victory that was significant for the further military organization of defense.

With the consolidation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that took place in stages, the picture of the strategic relations on the Bosnia-Herzegovina fronts has also changed. Departing from the factual situation of the occupation of the entire territory at the end of 1991 and, at the beginning of 1992 [words indistinct] concentration of the troops of the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army after their withdrawal from Slovenia and a part of Croatia, we created a situation after 42 months of war whereby the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army forces controlled [word indistinct] percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, and, together with the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], more than 52 percent of the territory on the day that the cease-fire agreement went into effect. We can determine the phases in the development of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on the basis of the degree of strategic initiative, the main characteristics of the armed activity on individual fronts, and the situation across the Bosnia-Herzegovina front.

The first phase, which involved the struggle to halt the aggressor and preserve the population and the territories, evolved from April 1992 to May 1993. In this period, the army swelled to the force of approximately 100,000 men, unfortunately, insufficiently armed in comparison to the technically far-superior aggressor.

The second phase, which involved the battle for communications on the free territories, lasted from May 1993 to March 1994. This was the struggle for the physical linking of the free territories under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the possibilities for the internal maneuvering and mobility of the army formations. At the end of this stage, as a result of consolidation, the army numbered approximately 200,000 men organized in brigades and corps.

The third phase, which lasted from March 1994 to the end of 1994, was the phase of the struggle for the establishment of a strategic equilibrium and for taking the initiative at the tactical level. In this period, the army, which was by now well-organized, but still lacked significant heavy arms and had uncertain logistical support, waged battles with the aggressor on a front that was about 1,400-km long, on the strategic premise that the aggressor could not endure continuous fighting on all parts of the extended front, which was difficult to access, and that the continuous combat activities along such a broad front would weaken him and compel him to agree to the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our leadership accepted this plan in 1994, regardless of its shortcomings, judging that the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina with political, economic, and other means would stand a greater chance in peace. We all know the fate of this plan.

The fourth phase, from the beginning of 1995 to October 1995, was the phase in which we assumed the strategic initiative. Taking advantage of the altered political circumstances, the positive geostrategic effects of the Washington agreement, and the better military cooperation with the forces of the HVO and the Croatian Army, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army troops, which were reorganized during the four months of the cease-fire from January to April 1995, waged effective battles for the liberation of the occupied territories. By first capturing the dominant positions in most strategic directions on the Bosnia-Herzegovina front, the army forces transformed this strategic [word indistinct] into operative successes in which Donji Vakuf, Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, Bosanska Krupa, and Sanski Most were liberated while considerable successes were also accomplished on the Vlasic-Vozuca and other fronts.

With the signing of the cease-fire agreement, which came into effect on 12 October 1995, the army forces were halted in their successful liberation advance at the moment when they were on the doorstep of the towns in Bosnian Krajina and in a situation where the paramilitary formations of the so-called Serb Republic were threatened with complete collapse and disorder. On this occasion, just like a little earlier with the example of the tragic fate of Srebrenica, one was able to see clearly how great was the influence of certain international factors on individual stages of the war in our country, especially on concrete military and political solutions, ranging from the imposed embargo that created the strategic basis for the aggression against our country to the plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina's division along ethnic lines, and to the various attempts to avoid a clear and precise definition of the aggression against our country and by this also the obligations that the norms of international law dictate in such cases.

Because of all the conditions stated above, the army was forced to carry out the combat activities and the defense of the free territories with the extensive use of its human potential, by covering the territory with poorly armed and poorly equipped units, which also gave rise to a great effort for the units engaged as well as a relatively high toll in killed and injured soldiers. In the most difficult circumstances that military theory and doctrine know of, our army achieved considerable military and political results, from among which I would only single out the most important: One, we halted the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and preserved the population and the most-important segment of its strategically important industry and infrastructure; In the course of 1994 and 1995, we liberated several thousand square kilometers of territory from the Serb aggressor; We took the strategic initiative, which resulted in the political success and the recognition of Bosnia's integrity in the present form. In light of the ratio of powers, the levels of armament and equipment, and the demographic potentials of our country and the aggressor, this outcome, which exceeded the expectations, can be explained by the good organization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as a whole and the greater motivation and higher combat morale of our soldiers and officers. We acquired vast military experience, which represents a substantial military capital that must be used further. It is no secret that all information and experiences from the Bosnia-Herzegovina theater of operations are to this very day being carefully analyzed by nearly all the armies in the world.

The peace placed new tasks before the political and military leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which must be realized in a planned, qualitative, and responsible manner. This primarily involves the transformation of the army into a peacetime military formation that is capable of defending Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peace within it.

A consequence of this transformation is a great number of demobilized soldiers for whom we must safeguard employment and full involvement in the country's reconstruction. The care for the families of fallen soldiers and war invalids must continue in peacetime, in the hope that it will be better and more complete.

[Words indistinct] in the army will be faced with the challenge of forming, training, and [word indistinct] the units on the basis of the criteria of all modern armies of this world and the experiences gained during the recently completed liberation war of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people. [applause]

B-H: Ganic Speech During Ceremony Marking Army Day

AU1604171596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 16 Apr 96

[Speech by Ejup Ganic, a memb[illegible] of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the celebration of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Day in Sarajevo on 16 April—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ladies and gentlemen, dear soldiers and officers, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has awarded the Order of Freedom to the Army and all of our soldiers, known and unknown heroes from the first line of the front.

This is a recognition of the most courageous sons of Bosnia who have defended and protected the people, the country, and the state. Wherever you were present, every families was safe, be it a Bosniak, Croat, Serb, Jewish, or any other family. Wherever you were present, there now exists a (?healthy) Bosnia. You have created the conditions for us to move forward to build the future.

Two days ago, President Alija Izetbegovic said in Zenica that, after the war criminals have been removed, we should aim for reconciliation in Bosnia. The word reconciliation is a big, profound, and deep word. It obliges us to remember the evil so that it does not happen again and to punish all the war criminals for the sake of a new life. The word reconciliation, after this war, can only be uttered by brave people who have vision, belief, and trust in the future of Bosnia, people who have heart as well as soul for all the Bosnian children and their future.

Our soldiers have given us a chance to finish peacefully, through dialogue, and with the help of international mediators and IFOR [Implementation Force], what was not finished in the war. In this part of Europe, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is a new factor of peace, defense, and stability. The program of the Army has been and will remain Bosnian, regardless of the fact that the Bosniaks, proportionally speaking, constitute the majority. There are also Croats in the Army, there are Serbs and Jews. Of course, there are not as many of them as we would like and need there to be, but the germ of togetherness in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has (?presumably) remained present. This had been the additional strength of our Army.

Those Serbs and the Croats in the Bosnian Army are giving support and sense to the idea of reconciliation. A big [word indistinct] open (?hand) [words indistinct] to all the well-intentioned people. This is the [word indistinct] of an eternal, indestructible, and integral Bosnia as a country and as an idea.

I would like to address the mothers of the Bosnian soldiers in particular. Your sons deserve to bear the Order of Freedom. Our appeal at the beginning of the war for the defense of the country would have been only one among many appeals in vain if you, respected Bosnian mothers, had not passed to your children the love for Bosnia and, toward that goal, taught them to respect what belongs to others and to protect what is theirs. Thank you. [applause]

B-H: State Seen as 'Castle in the Air'

AU1604085996 Sarajevo DANI in Serbo-Croatian Apr 96 pp 22-23

[Commentary by Zoran Pirolic: "Open Card Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Petersburg (near Bonn, not the more famous one in Russia), the well-known company of faces from the Federation will celebrate the second anniversary of this community of Bosniaks and Croats for which there is scarcely a match anywhere around, near or far. Michael Steiner, Carl Bildt's deputy, cautiously says that "the situation in the Federation is not good." The situation, of course, is much worse than the German diplomat is ready to admit.

On the other hand, the Federation's health is much better than this community's relations with the Serb Republic. All in all, today's Bosnia resembles the Middle Ages when feudal provinces began to constitute themselves and then started to divide into states. Before the eyes of the inhabitants of this country and the international observers, a policentric community is being created, a community with little common essence and few common interests that would enable it to survive as a state. As Richard Holbrooke would say, the preconditions for a double Anschluss are being created, as an expected step after the departure of NATO troops from Bosnia.

Gloves Peeled Off

Nikola Koljevic, who, with absolutely no justification enjoys the reputation of a man of a more liberal orientation in the Pale leadership, has openly announced that the Serb Republic would officially issue writs for a referendum on secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina and integration with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In order to come to the referendum, the Pale leadership must pass one more small obstacle, called free and fair elections in Bosnia. If the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) wins the elections (which the opposition in Banja Luka doubts very much, but one never knows), the new referendum can be expected with almost 100 percent certainty. That is the trump card the Pale leadership always has up their sleeve.

While aforementioned Michael Steiner says that Herzeg-Bosnia is an illegal and nonexistent organization for the world, the president of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak, thinks the opposite. In his interview to the Sarajevo SVIJET, Zubak says that "Herzeg-Bosnia exists and it will exist. It exists as a form of political, economic, and every other form of organizing the nation. In all complex states, nations are organized that way." It is a perfectly clear statement which, nevertheless, could not have been expected from the president of the Bosniak-Croat federation. If there is Herzeg-Bosnia, then there is no Federation, or, at least, there is no wish for a federal community with the Bosniaks. When in the heat of the political polemics one peels off one's gloves, one can easily commit a slip of the tongue and say something that would utterly disclose the positions of the sides facing each other.

In his first political appearance after his heart problems, the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, has also left much room for different interpretations. In his interview to FOCUS magazine, the Bosnia-Herzegovina president expresses the opinion that a section of the Bosnian Croats (those who are in power and who have weapons in their hands) does not want the federation with the Bosniaks. "They do not want to say so openly, so then they apply the tactics of wearing us down, so that we are the first to say that we are fed up with that game and cancel the Federation project." The statement leaves room for the opportunity "for us, as the second, to say that we are fed up with that game."

Worn-Out Material

The situation in post-Dayton Bosnia is such that it opens whole new horizons of guessing about a possible disintegration of this country. Even the biggest friends of this country in the United States, France, or Germany, speak pessimistically about the reality of creating three small ethnic states in Bosnia. The American intelligence agency, CIA, and one cannot doubt that it is well-informed, openly says that one can expect the disintegration of Bosnia after the departure of NATO troops in December this year.

It would be hypocritical to claim that it is an unexpected development. All experts in the crisis in former Yugoslavia have immediately noticed that the software for the political reconstruction of Bosnia was infected with a virus in Dayton, the virus that will activate itself the moment the soldiers fall silent, and the politicians take the floor. The French have openly said that they do not want to participate for a long period of time in a peace process in Bosnia that will result in the division of the country. It would be really excessive exaggeration to say that this statement had pushed the alarm button in the European Union. At the last meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels, the foreign ministers were strongly overshadowed by the ministers of agriculture. The crisis of cattle-breeding in Great Britain, after this new disease among the island's cows, was much more important and caused much fiercer discussion than the already boring Bosnian conflict.

A certain tiredness with the matter is increasingly apparent among the international powers that deal with Bosnia. The U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher left the Moscow meeting of foreign ministers of the international Contact Group for Bosnia before it ended. Although the Americans say that Secretary Christopher, at 70, is an old and tired man, and that the marathon conferences on Bosnia are too much for him, the reasons for leaving them are of a completely different nature. First of all, Christopher has tied the score to 1:1 with the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, who skipped a very similar conference in Geneva, and has also given an important signal to all the Bosnian sides: Gentlemen, the United States does not intend to deal with your problems for ever!

Castle in the Air

The foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY in Moscow almost like a chorus repeated the promises their presidents had given in Geneva, which in no way changed the deeply rooted stands of all sides about this country. Does anyone still remember what both President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia said after Geneva, and how much those statements differ from the previous ones, let us say from those in Rome or Paris? Or, what Vice President Ejup Ganic announced after the Geneva meeting?

Nobody has either the will nor the nerve to make such a balance, because the gap between the statements and the situation on the ground is growing bigger and bigger. Everybody swears by the Dayton agreement, by the united (divided) Bosnia, by the respect for human rights and pluralism, by the great importance of free and fair elections, and by a dozen nice phrases that should turn Bosnia into a Balkan Switzerland overnight. The contrast between the reality and the words meanwhile grows bigger and bigger. Today's Bosnia is nothing but a castle in the air, whose components are still held together only by a miracle.

If Milosevic and Tudjman do not want to say openly that Bosnia cannot survive as an united state, and that its Serb and Croat part must join its eastern or western neighbor respectively, their epigones in Pale and in Banja Luka, or in western Mostar and Grude, do not mince words. For them, the united Bosnia is dead, that is, as one of the Herzeg-Bosnia fighters said—"what has been grabbed has been grabbed, and that is it!"

The fragmentation of the former common state of southern Slavs has reached the point when one has to fix the final boundaries between the Serbs and the Croats. In Croatia there is one more little thing that ought to be solved and that is the question of eastern Slavonia, which will, without doubt, become part of a sovereign, young democracy. By fixing the final boundaries, the division of Bosnia also takes its turn according to the agenda, as the final blow that one will be unable to parry. The tired international community, discouraged Bosnian Serbs and Croats who believe in a common Bosnian state, as well as the majority of the Bosniaks and their political forces, will be able to do very little when the final division of this country starts from Zagreb and Belgrade, and their branch offices over here.

Medicine Man and Indians

Foreign correspondents who have spent the last couple of days in Gorazde speak about the eagerness of the inhabitants of that town to move to Sarajevo, and about the growing number of Gorazde inhabitants seen going in the direction of Bosnia's capital. According to the same sources, in Gorazde one can buy tenancy rights in Sarajevo even for a sum of 500 German marks. Although this town is connected to the rest of the Federation by the corridor of life, its inhabitants instinctively feel that in case of a definite division of Bosnia, that corridor would become an appendix that can easily be removed sooner or later.

Just as in the popular joke about the Indians and their medicine man, who guesses what the winter will be like according to whether the Indians collect firewood for winter or not, thus it seems this time that the people have some kind of presentiment even before their leaders. Even if it remains formally in one piece, as a loose community of three little national states, two of which will be much more tied to Zagreb and Belgrade than to Sarajevo, the threat of a complete split will constantly hang over Bosnia like the sword of Damocles.

B-H: UBSD Calls For Open, Democratic Political Debate

AU1604143796 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 16 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Call For Open Dialogue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the election campaign, the media must equally cover various political options. However, during the central Dnevnik newscast of Bosnia-Herzegovina Television, editorial manipulation and noncoverage of my responses to any of the 10 questions I was asked on 13 April 1996, represent the crudest kind of stratagem and an attempt to denigrate the principled stand of the UBSD [Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats].

Through an obvious privatization of state television, Senad Hadzifejzovic has tried to disguise the essence of the problems that were pointed out at the 8 April 1996 UBSD conference. More and more often, Mr. Izetbegovic misuses his announced appearances as president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the most brutal showdowns against people with different opinions and the crude denigration of other political parties. One does not dispute the right of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] president to make political appearances on state television, but one cannot at the same time deny the right to representatives of other political parties to reply to and criticize the political stands of the ruling political parties. The UBSD is ready for debate and polemics before the public eye on all the issues, and therefore has been asking for more than two years for weekly television programs with democratic debates to be introduced among the representatives of different political parties. On this occasion, as well, the UBSD calls on the SDA president or representatives to hold an open talk before the television cameras about the stands that were presented by Mr. Izetbegovic in his interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Television.

UBSD Vice President Sejfudin Tokic sent a letter to Transitional Electoral Commission Chairman Robert Frowick; Amila Omersoftic, acting director general of Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television; Kasim Begic, chairman of the Managing Board of Radio and Television and member of the Transitional Electoral Commission; and Gradimir Gojer, chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television Program Council.

B-H: Kljuic Demands End to 'Concession Making' With Serbs

AU1604132296 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by S.K.: "Concessions Should Not Be Made to Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republican Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not agree with the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation Governments are conducting a policy of constant concession making to the members of the so-called Serb entity. "The extremists from the Serb entity demolished and set fire to the crucially important facilities as they withdrew from the reintegrated areas and, instead of being tried for the barbarian behavior and crimes, our government called for their participation at the Brussels meeting," Stjepan Kljuic, chairman of the Republican Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said. The Republican Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina will present a demand to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Constituent Assembly that certain deputies who have two functions in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina resign. "They should remain deputies in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Constituent Assembly and resign from their ministerial positions in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government," Kljuic said.

B-H: EU Survey Finds 'Corruption' in Mostar

AU1604125396 Paris AFP in English 1137 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, April 16 (AFP)—The European Union's spending watchdog has identified corruption in the EU's administration of the divided Bosnian town of Mostar, sources said Tuesday.

The Cour des Comptes, the Luxembourg-based body which monitors fraud against the EU budget, has completed a preliminary report which identifies a series of financial irregularities which occurred during the first 19 months of EU administration of the divided city.

The report will be made public in June after being reviewed by EU ministers and the European Commission.

A court source denied however that major fraud had taken place. "There were irregularities but they do not appear to have been very serious given the difficult context."

Mostar, the scene of violent clashes between Bosnian Croats and Moslems in 1993 and early 1994, was placed under EU administration in July 1994. Since then the Union has spent 130 million dollars in the city, notably on the restoration of public services.

A new EU administrator, Ricardo Perez Casado of Spain, is due to take up his functions on April 22. His appointment followed the resignation of Germany's Hans Koschnick after violent protests from Croats angered by his reunification plans for the city.

B-H: EU Figure Denies Mostar Corruption Charge

AU1604183696 Paris AFP in English
1815 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Brussels, April 16 (AFP)—The European Union's spending watchdog has identified corruption in the EU's administration of the divided Bosnian town of Mostar, sources said Tuesday. [passage omitted]

Hans Koschnick, the former EU administrator who left Mostar earlier this month, told a Berlin newspaper due to appear Wednesday that the inquiry was looking into "purely technical" accounting matters and said there was no suggestion of dishonesty in his administration.

"The report is arguing about some technical accounting matters. There is no suggestion of any misappropriation of funds," he told the BERLINER ZEITUNG daily.

When it started operations in Mostar, the EU administration had not been able to follow standard European Commission accounting procedures, he said.

"We paid a lot of things in cash. Bank payments were not possible because there was not a functioning banking system" in the town, he said.

A new EU administrator, Ricardo Perez Casado of Spain, is due to take up his functions on April 22. His appointment followed Koschnick's resignation after violent protests from Croats angered by his reunification plans for the city.

B-H: Mrkonjic Grad Killings Seen as Test for Hague Court

AU1604204296 Novi Sad DNEVNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by Milan Bozokin: "Mrkonjic Grad Tests The Hague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the biggest crimes against the Serb population in this war was committed in the town of Mrkonjic Grad. Only after (according to the Dayton agreement) it was given to the Serb Republic were the heavy crimes committed in the town by the members of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] discovered.

One hundred and eighty-one dead bodies were exhumed from two mass graves. The victims had mostly been killed by blows to the head—which can be seen from the findings of the autopsies performed by medical experts—and then they were thrown into the mass grave. That was not enough for the killers; they continued their bloody purge and burned the houses of their victims. This clearly shows that it was a calculated act against humanity. After they took western Bosnia, the Croats tried to erase every trace of Serbs. They did not hesitate to commit the heaviest of crimes, they did not spare anybody. The crimes that were committed against the Serbs in Mrkonjic Grad remind one of similar crimes committed in Pavelic's NDH [Independent State of Croatia, from World War II]. The testimony of the head of the medical team in Mrkonjic Grad, pathologist Zoran Stankovic, illustrates best what sort of crime this was; he says that in this war he worked on the medical autopsies of around 3,000 victims, but that this was the hardest work because it was a whole "mosaic" of monstrous killings.

The exhumation was supervised by numerous international bodies and foreign journalists. There was also the representative of the Hague Tribunal, John Geris [name as published], who could see on the spot the dimensions of the crime against the civilian population and soldiers. He saw and noted everything, and it remains to be seen what will be taken over by the International War Crimes Tribunal. There should now be enough evidence to bring charges against some Croats.

There are indications that Croatian forces committed this crime against the Serbs out of revenge. Witnesses say that when they heard that Croatian General Andrija Matijas was killed, Croatian soldiers were ordered to "kill and burn everything that is Serbian." Who gave that order? It is known exactly which units of the Croatian Army and of the HVO took part in the fighting, and who orders movements and issues commands in

Zagreb. Those people are still occupying high posts in the Croatian Army, or they are sitting on the highest state court. Only naive people can believe that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman did not know that the regular army went to another state to fight, and that the head of the Main Staff of the Croatian Army, General Zvonimir Cervenko, did not plan the main moves in the military operations in Bosnia.

The answer of the tribunal to the frequent objections of Serbs, that the Hague Tribunal had been formed only for them, was that this court would try impartially all perpetrators of war crimes, regardless of the side they might come from. In the present practice the Hague Tribunal has not proven that. The exhumation of the dead bodies from the two, until now the biggest, mass graves with Serb victims in Mkonjic Grad, is an opportunity for Richard Goldstone to convince the Serbs and all who believe in justice of the impartiality of the Hague Tribunal. Goldstone should now finally see that which has already been seen by the entire world.

B-H: Croats Submit War Crimes Evidence to Hague Tribunal

LD1604171596 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia held a meeting today at which the implementation of conclusions from a previous meeting was analyzed. The conclusions were in connection with tasks assigned to relevant government bodies to take measures with a view to initiating criminal proceedings against persons on whom there is well-founded suspicion of having participated in numerous crimes against the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Reports on the level of implementation of these tasks were submitted by representatives of the government, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice and Administration, and the War Crimes Commission of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. In their reports they said that measures have been taken with a view to initiating criminal proceedings; collected evidence has also been forwarded to the international tribunal in The Hague which should bring charges against suspects.

B-H: International Officials on Disputed Villages Issue

AU1604130496 Paris AFP in English 1211 GMT 16 Apr 96

[By Kevin McElde]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 16 (AFP)—Hopes are rising here of a breakthrough in talks that could halt the transfer of six frontline Muslim villages to Bosnian Serb control, Western officials said Tuesday.

Negotiations have so far failed to break the deadlock between the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Serbs over who will control the remote communities locked in the northeast Bosnian hills.

But an official of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said prospects of a deal on the future of the villages and other communities have improved so much that IFOR has pulled back from a threat to end its role hosting the talks.

An official in the office of High Representative Carl Bildt, the senior civilian overseeing the Bosnian peace process, said both sides appeared to be willing eventually to negotiate a swap.

It could mean exchanging the six villages near the town of Sapna for Serb territory handed to Moslem-Croat Federation control under the Dayton peace accord.

After nearly four years defending their remote homes against attack, the villagers have vowed to stay put even though they fear the Serbs will try to force them out to make room for Serb refugees from other parts of Bosnia.

IFOR spokesman British Major Simon Haselock said the last talks on a series of territorial proposals held on April 12 had been one of the most productive so far.

"We're hopeful. There does appear now to be serious negotiation over this issue," he said.

"There's a much brighter future ahead for Sapna if they (the Serbs) are prepared to look at it locally and they seem more willing to now," Haselock added.

"We're trying to keep Dobrinja separate," he said, referring to a suburb of Sarajevo whose future is also in dispute.

He said the NATO rapid reaction force, which has been hosting the talks but is not allowed to impose a solution, had planned to "cut and run" because of lack of progress, but had now opted to press on.

An official in Bildt's office said: "The signals from both camps have been that they will eventually be happy to swap, but will try to procrastinate as much as possible."

"They're adamant they should not budge from the area an inch," he added.

When an AFP reporter visited the villages, people there vowed not to move but "fight with stones if necessary" to stay in their homes.

They said they were bitter that the Dayton accord had apparently handed the Serbs what they could not take by force.

The situation in the villages as talks drag on has become increasingly tense. A UN civilian police officer told AFP last week he was lucky to get out of one of them as frustrated residents threatened to turn violent.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Official Views Brussels Boycott

BR1604131496 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 14 Apr 96 p 6

[Report on interview with Dusan Gogic, identified as new commissioner of the government of the Bosnian Serb Republic, by Ricardo Estarriol in Banja Luka on 13 April: "Karadzic Badly Received in Banja Luka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—Another mistake. That was the terse conclusion of Dusan Gogic, the new government commissioner for the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia," speaking about his government's decision to boycott yesterday's conference in Brussels on the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina.

For four years, from his office in the town of Doboj, Gogic was the humanitarian aid director for the whole Banja Luka region. However, the Serbian politician has no intention of moving his office to Pale, the seat of the Bosnian Serb government.

In a conversation with this correspondent, Gogic expressed the opinion of the Serbian leaders in Banja Luka whose dispute with the Pale leadership is already an open secret. Carl Bildt, the senior official of the international community in Bosnia, had done everything in his power to facilitate the Bosnian Serbs' participation in the conference which is charged with collecting and distributing the international community's aid for reconstruction.

In his eagerness for the Bosnian Serbs to attend the Brussels conference, Carl Bildt gave up the demand on Pale to release 16 Muslim prisoners of war and did not wait until the International War Crimes Tribunal [IWCT] in the Hague ruled on the affair. Bildt was satisfied with the release of three prisoners of whom the International Red Cross had previously had no news.

In accordance with the Dayton agreements, all prisoners of war should already have been released several weeks ago. Agreeing to the presence of the Bosnian Serbs in Brussels would have meant turning a blind eye to this fundamental point of the agreement. In any event, when everything appeared to have been settled and Bildt considered the release of the three "new" prisoners to be in the bag, the representatives of the Pale government refused to go to Brussels, stating that they did not wish to form part of a joint delegation from the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic who ordered his politicians to boycott the conference. Nikola Koljevic, the vice president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, said on Friday evening [12 April] that the international community was trying to apply political pressure on the Bosnian Serbs through economic arguments. He justified the boycott of the Brussels conference by claiming: "This is blackmail."

The decision went down very badly in Banja Luka, the most densely populated area of the self-styled Bosnian Serb republic, which had to take in many of the Serbian refugees from Croatia and the Bosnian territories not controlled by the Serbian Army. Most of the population lives off the humanitarian aid provided by the EU, UNHCR, and many nongovernmental organizations.

The Serbian officials in Banja Luka are increasingly specific when they talk about the political situation. They are not surprised that Karadzic was not welcomed the last time he came to Banja Luka, nor are they surprised that the Bosnian Serb president did not dare to visit the town of Prijedor in late February.

Karadzic preferred to play hide and seek in Banja Luka with the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops accompanying Carl Bildt, who met in Prijedor with the three heads of state of Bosnia: the Bosnian state, the Croatian-Muslim federation, and the Bosnian Serb republic.

"It was the Banja Luka authorities who did not want anything to do with Karadzic," commented Gogic, who added that "it is impossible to keep people at the pinnacle of power who are not accepted by the international community."

Undesirables

Karadzic has been summoned by the International Court of The Hague to stand trial for war crimes, as has the Bosnian Serb military leader, Ratko Mladic.

The people of Banja Luka also want nothing to do with politicians like Velibor Ostojic, deputy prime minister of the Bosnian Serb republic and president of the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party], the Bosnian branch of the party led by Serbian President Milosevic.

Ostojic is a typical representative of the movement for a greater Serbia. He was minister of information for Bosnia-Herzegovina when it had not yet declared its independence. He too is being sought by the International Court of The Hague for his alleged participation in the massacre in the town of Foca (in Eastern Bosnia). "With actions like those," Gogic said, "there will be no peaceful future here in Banja Luka."

The Serbian politicians of Banja Luka, including Mayor Predrag Radic, are of the opinion that NATO will need a lot more time to secure peace in Bosnia and that one year will not be enough. "They must stay for at least another four years."

One cannot but be surprised that it is precisely the side punished by the NATO airstrikes—everyone in Banja Luka remembers the 11 Tomahawk missiles that fell on the Serbian radar and communications installations—that is now asking for NATO troops to stay longer. If the Americans pull out then the Europeans will have to stay, "including the Germans," Gogic concluded.

B-H: Krajisnik Comments on Brussels Conference

LD1604154996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1526 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 16 (TANJUG)—The speaker of the Assembly of the Bosnian Serb state Republika Sprska, Momcilo Krajisnik, said on Tuesday that the international community had done everything to discredit the Serbs and practically prevent them from taking part in the Brussels conference for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In a statement to Radio Obrenovac, Serbia, Krajisnik recalled that Republika Srpska had been allowed to attend the Brussels conference, held on April 12-13, but only on condition that it appears as a part of a joint delegation headed by the Bosnian prime minister.

According to Krajisnik, Republika Srpska had told the high representative of the international community, Carl Bildt, that this would be a violation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement according to which there can be no government in Bosnia until the elections are held. Krajisnik said that these remarks were rejected and the Bosnian Serbs accused of boyotting the Brussels conference.

The Serbs said that the insistence on economic reintegraton according to the Brussels model is a violation of the Dayton agreement and that economic aid also contains elements of blackmail, but this was unjustly described as a boycott of the conference, which is a classic "substitution of theses."

Through the economic aid, the West wants to realize certain political aims, primarily the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Army General Ratko Mladic from the political scene, Krajisnik said.

These Bosnian Serb officials have been charged of committing war crimes by the international tribunal in The Hague.

Krajisnik said that Karadzic and Mladic bear the burden of the anathema of Republika Srpska. He added that "the insistence of the international community on arresting Karadzic and Gen. Mladic have only increased their popularity among the serb people."

Karadzic said that "no-one in Republika Srpska believes in the guilt of Karadzic and Mladic and the people view this as an attempt by the West to remove the leaders of Republika Srpska." He said that "the Serbs have never betrayed their leaders for money, and will not do so now."

B-H: Koljevic Interview on Elections, Ties to FRY

AU1604154796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Nikola Koljevic, "vice president of the Serb Republic," by Rade Stanic in Trebinje; date not given: "Borders Are No Longer Important"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "Ducic's Poetry Evening" event that took place recently in Trebinje was an occasion on which the Association of Authors of the Serb Republic collectively joined the Association of Authors of Serbia. We talked with Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, who is also the chairman of the Association of Authors of the Serb Republic, about the symbolism of this act within the context of the Dayton accord, as well as about other issues regarding its implementation.

[Stanic] Is the unification of the Association of Authors of the Serb Republic and that of Serbia the first step toward the institutional unification of the two states?

[Koljevic] I hope this is the second step. The first step was of an economic nature, that is, the establishment of the joint payment operations system between the Serb Republic and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The second step, however, is symbolically significant. I think that, after that, the existing borders are no longer important, and Richard Holbrooke's nightmare that the Serb Republic might unite with the FRY is just an election trick. On one hand, our unification will come about regardless of the borders, which means that we shall be cooperating, and this means we shall unite. On the other hand, the borders in modern Europe are more a matter of customs and Interpol, rather than anything else. Even if we were to stay in the union [of Bosnia-Herzegovina], which I do not feel is what our partners desire, particularly the Muslims, we shall actually be united through this cooperation.

[Stanic] Following the signing of the Declaration on a Unified Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic said that any attempt to disrupt the state's integrity would trigger a new war.

[Koljevic] They are saying one thing and doing a something else. The Muslims should first agree among themselves. They do not attend meetings regularly, they show no particular interest in cooperation, and they did not hold our visit to Sarajevo in particular esteem. In geopolitical terms, of course, we shall be cooperating with the Federation, but to what extent—that depends on them. There is a well-known saying that it takes two to tango. However, they are still talking about war crimes and compiling their own lists of war criminals that have nothing to do with The Hague list.

[Stanic] As for the Tribunal in The Hague, are there any changes in your attitude toward it?

[Koljevic] Just like the FRY, the Serb Republic held the attitude that it would cooperate through the Ministry of Justice, which presupposes two subjects [as published]. As for the beginning of the work of The Hague Tribunal, we consider it to be irregular, not only in view of the indictment for war crimes brought against the leader of the Serb side and not against others, but also in view of the manner in which General Djukic and [Colonel] Krsmanovic were arrested. The cooperation will depend on the behavior of The Hague Tribunal and its institutions. That The Hague Tribunal itself acknowledges the illegality of its work is seen from the Rome document, in which it is stated that, in the future, it will not be possible to arrest people who are not on the official list.

[Stanic] How do you comment on the desire of the two members of the army of the Serb Republic to testify in The Hague? One of them claims that, after the taking of Srebrenica, he himself took part in the execution of civilians and prisoners of war.

[Koljevic] I learned about this statement from the media. If that is really their desire and if they do have something to say, they ought to do that.

[Stanic] One of the aspects of the Dayton accord is the return of refugees. Are the Serbs, that is, the Muslims or the Croats, coming back, indeed?

[Koljevic] I doubt that the Serbs would return, because they took with them the most sacred thing to them, as we have witnessed. On the other hand, the desire to return undoubtedly exists, within the context of attempts in the post-Dayton period to restore an integral Bosnia in one way or the other, and if in no other way, then certainly by the worst sort of warfare—biological and demographic warfare. So I do not think this issue has anything to do with homesickness, but rather with a method of political struggle to which terrorist activity will certainly be added. We will not be able, or have a right to prevent refugees from coming back, but nobody will be able to return until the Serb refugees from central Bosnia, and now from Sarajevo, are resettled. We cannot throw our people out into the streets just to enable those who used to live here to return. Revitalization and reconstruction first, and only then repatriation.

[Stanic] The agreement on free movement is still not being observed.

[Koljevic] Implementation Force [IFOR] troops are feeling free while moving in our territory, and the Muslims are feeling relatively free. Free movement is to be secured by organizing IFOR escorts. I do not see why traveling to Srbinje [Foca] would not be possible if IFOR provided an escort, or traveling from Bihac to Travnik, in which the Muslims are particularly interested.

The war is a matter of the past. People are not saying that this is a rapid peace, let alone an instant one, and psychologically it does not work as rapidly. [sentence as published] Since the peace is signed, which is good, its implementation ought to progress gradually. In Geneva, I talked with Mr. Muratovic [Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister] and insisted that certain road and railroad communications should be secured totally, rather than merely freed. An incident or two, and the possibility of free movement will be delayed for six months.

[Stanic] Are there any chances of postponing the elections until the year's end?

[Koljevic] Due to violations of the Dayton accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation has been radicalized, rather than pacified. Even in a relatively stable situation, however, elections would be necessary for several reasons: because the mandates of officials on all sides have expired and because legality in relations is introduced more easily in such a way. Finally, I think that it is much better to conduct the elections despite their relative nature, because the mandates of new officials will last only two years. Therefore, one should not expect perfect conditions. These are going to be the first elections, and speaking in realistic terms, if they are conducted in a not-entirely democratic manner or if they fail to fully reflect the will of the people living in the region, we shall have a second chance in two years.

[Stanic] What are the relations like between the leadership of the Serb Republic and Slobodan Milosevic and to what extent is your leadership independent in decisionmaking?

[Koljevic] First of all, the Serb Republic depends on Serbia because it is our mother-country and, in geopolitical terms, this is a clear matter. People who do not see this are politically illiterate, and they do not wish their people well. We cannot determine political trends in Yugoslavia, and we have to cooperate to the extent that they want to cooperate with us. The relations with Slobodan Milosevic are correct, and as is known, we have authorized him to represent us, and his influence is founded on this fact. I hope most sincerely that his right to represent us will not endanger the interests of the Serb Republic. I saw in Geneva that Milosevic promoted other interests of the Serb Republic, primarily the question of our access to the sea, where it was specified that it was not only about the issue of Prevlaka, but also about the right of the Serb Republic to a stretch of the coast, and he also promoted our interests regarding Brcko.

What will eventually emerge from all this is a different question. However, my impression is that a number of problems have been left aside for reasons regarding media promotion, so that the successes of President Clinton in solving other problems throughout the year will appear more significant and thereby improve his chances in the U.S. election campaign.

In this respect, there is another, more serious problem: The difference between the European and U.S. views of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It can be discerned that it will be the Americans who will insist on stronger links with the Europeans. It is clear to England and France, and lately even to Germany, that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be achieved only if the desire of one people—that is obviously not interested in any deeper multiethnic connections for the time being—is observed. What things will look like tomorrow is something else.

[Stanic] Is a new war possible after IFOR's departure?

[Koljevic] I do not expect that. However, unsolved problems regarding borders and the possibility of terrorism pose a serious danger.

[Box, p 2]

[Stanic] Has the Serb Republic renounced people who found asylum in FRY, either because they dodged army service or because they fled from the war?

[Koljevic] A ruling has been made that those people are to be amnestied, but they will not be entitled to certain privileges that soldiers enjoy. We consider that part of our population to be necessary and valuable in view of the economic situation and skills that many of them possess. Besides, there is a very simple reason: People began to talk about deserters as early as in 1993 and 1994. In 1992, there was such chaos in the state that people were leaving just to save their lives. We did not have an organized army at the time, and who has the right now to call them deserters?

[Box, p 2]

[Stanic] It is obvious that all sides in the conflict committed war crimes. Why did the state institutions of the Serb Republic not conduct an investigation in the course of the war, or at least at the end of it?

[Koljevic] That is a good question. Probably because many other things could not be resolved in the course of the war, which does not mean that they cannot be resolved after it. The obvious answer is that, due to military operations, it was possible for people who committed such crimes to conceal and represent them as a method of struggle against the enemy. Now is certainly the right time to start dealing seriously with such matters.

B-H: Finnish Team Works To Identify Srebrenica Victims

AU1604182496 Paris AFP in English
1805 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, April 16 (AFP)—A Finnish medico-legal team is preparing to begin the grim process of identifying the first of thousands of victims of the Srebrenica massacre, the UN special envoy on human rights said Tuesday.

The team of volunteers is ready to begin work but is waiting for NATO troops to de-mine the area of inspection in Kravica, near Srebrenica, where a mass grave was discovered last July, Elisabeth Rehn said.

The pilot project will allow between 50 and 60 bodies to be identified, Rehn told reporters after presenting her report to the annual session of the UN Commission on Human Rights here.

Rehn went on a fact-finding mission to Bosnia's known mass grave sites in February.

The Finnish project marks the first action by the international community to respond to the families of some 8,000 people missing since the former Moslem enclave was overrun by the Bosnian Serbs last July, Rehn said.

"We should not give too much hope for considerable numbers of people still to be found alive," she cautioned. "The most important thing for people to know is the truth, even when it is a very sad one."

Between 27,000 and 30,000 people are missing after the war in the former Yugoslavia, she said.

Finland has pledged to finance the 120,000-dollar project, the UN special rapporteur said, adding that she will return to the former Yugoslavia in May and June.

Croatia: Court Names Would-Be Assassins of Fikret Abdic

LD1604191196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The County Court in Rijeka has disclosed the names of five terrorists from Bosnia-Herzegovina who were planning to assassinate Fikret Abdic. The members of the so-called Bihac Group were arrested near Senj on 4 April.

[Correspondent] Extensive investigations revealed how Dervis Demirovic, Hajrudin Halilagic, Zijad Zulic, Jasmin Osmankic, and 20-year-old Senada Muhanovic, all of Bihac, took part in planning the assassination attempt against Fikret Abdic. An inquiry is also being conducted into another person who has not yet been detained by the state organs of the Republic of Croatia and whose identity is not being disclosed in the interests of the inquiry. In the order for the inquiry, this person is regarded as the ringleader and is a state official of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was planned that Fikret Abdic would be killed by a hand-held grenade launcher while driving along a very busy section of the Rijeka-Opatija road. The group's weapons were discovered in woods above the road, an area visited by the group several times. The weapons found were two hand-held launchers and grenades, seven hand grenades, plastic explosives, machineguns, and five hand-launched antitank grenades.

Under article 135 of the basic penal code of the Republic of Croatia, the accused are charged with the criminal act of international terrorism, which carries a sentence of up to 15 years imprisonment. Until investigation proceedings are completed, the accused are being held in the district prison in Rijeka.

Croatia: New Coalition of Right Parties Formed

AU1704084796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Apr 96 pp 6

[Article by G. Novacic: "Coalition of All Parties of Right Formed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—A new party entered the Croatian political scene on Monday [15 April]. As journalists were informed at the press conference given by Dujo Matijasevic, member of the Independent Party of Right [NZS], the Coalition of All Parties of Right was formed by the HCSP (The Croatian Pure Party of Right)—a part of the HSP [The Croatian Party of Right] that does not recognize the HSP assembly session held in February this year—the NZS, the Croatian Liberation Order, the Croatian Liberation Movement [the HOP], the Independent Croatian Volunteers and the Croatian State-Creating Movement [the HDP].

Branimir Peternel of the HOP spoke of the current political situation in Croatia, saying that the Coalition of All Parties of Right is really "a populist and a nationalist party" because, he said, "nationalism is the future, not the past."

"Our goal is to have a united political party based on the rightist and state-creating principles," Ante Prkacin said among other things, and added that just the Coalition of All Parties of Right "will reassert the rightist scene because the rightist movement in Croatia is at the point of death. We will put the Croatian rightist scene in order," Prkacin announced, asserting that "the ruling party cannot see Croatia because of their own grandness, the left is in expansion, and the right is nonexistent. We will make a strong political party that will create and shape Croatian politics," he said.

"If we fail to have 10 percent of the electoral body in the next seven to 10 months, then a state-creating party like ours has no reason to exist," Prkacin concluded, announcing that the assembly session of the Coalition might be held on May 23 this year.

Croatia: Serb Refugee Group Adopts Rights Declaration

AU1604165396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 11 Apr 96

[Report by Aleksandra Jaksic, Sara Pavlovic, and Nadezda Novakovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Union of Serb Refugees and Displaced Persons from the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Republic of Croatia must join hands with all those who were forced to leave their homes in Western Slavonia, Lika, Banija, Dalmatia, and Kordun and fight on the political scene to exercise their national and basic human rights," said Milenko Vucetic, newly appointed president of the municipal committee of the Union of Baranja Refugees. In order to successfully realize all goals of the Union, six task forces--i.e. committees through which Serb refugees will fight for their basic human rights, which are constantly being denied by the Republic of Croatia—were formed at the session. The following committees were formed: Committee for Assisting the Settlement Program and Providing Humanitarian and Other Aid; Committee for Preparing the Serbs for the Return to their Homes in the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Republic of Croatia; Committee for Cooperation with Government Institutions, International Organizations, and All Other Institutions and Unions; Committee for Assessing Damage to Property of Refugees and Crimes Committed Against the

Serb Nation; Information Committee; and Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms. The constituent session of the municipal committee of the Union of Refugees adopted a declaration on granting and guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the democratic world to Serb refugees and displaced persons. Here is the integral text of the declaration:

Peacemaking initiatives by world diplomats designed to normalize the situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia encompass the efforts to mediate the return of all refugees and displaced persons. Naturally, that implies the reestablishment of the coexistence of members of different nations and overcoming contradictions that lead to conflicts and secessionist, ethnic, and religious war. Their optimism and hope in coexistence between the warring nations is based on the fact that Yugoslav nations lived in one state since 1945 without major problems and conflicts until 1990. On the basis of that, they claim that the coexistence of people of various ethnic and religious affiliations is possible. Regardless of negative historical experiences regarding their coexistence with the Croats, the Serbs are prepared to return to their centuries-old abode where their ancestors lived, where they have their private property, places of worship, graves, all sorrows, and happiness, because they cannot relinquish nor forget that. However, before the Serbs return to their homes, the following terms must be met:

Annexes must be added to the Croatian Constitution to guarantee basic human, national, and other rights and freedoms to the Serb nation. Trust between the two ethnic communities—the Serb and the Croatian—must be restored on the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, provided that the international community ensures the political, economic, legislative, welfare, and cultural equality with the Croatian people. The Serb nation must be granted all religious rights, as well as the right to their own alphabet and language throughout the educational and information system. The Serbs' participation in authorities must be ensured, as well as their rights of employment, participation in the transformation of socially owned property to other forms of ownership, and just compensation for damaged or destroyed property. All the above is based on the continuity of the right of the Serbs as a nation that the Serbs brought into former Yugoslavias [as heard] with the Croats and the Slovenes. The continuity inherited from Austria-Hungary was valid until Croatia forcefully seceded from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. until the first constitution of 22 December 1990. We call upon the international community—at the close of the 20th century, at the time of fast technological and other progress—to provide us, as a civilized nation, with the possibility to decide, in a dignified, honorable, and above all humane way, about our coexistence on equal terms.

The bitter and sorrowful experience of the Serb nation from the war that ended recently is far too fresh. The experience only confirmed the enormous historical suffering of the Serbs. The planned reintegration under the symbols, signs, and names introduced by the Croatian state, does not offer the Serbs any hope of a normal life or existence as a free nation. Amid all the efforts to end the war and establish peace, the international community is neglecting many realistic threats coming from the representatives of the Croatian authorities. We therefore call upon the entire international community to objectively consider all the relations, both past and present, between the Croats and the Serbs. The international community should stop thinking about Croatia as a democratic and multiethnic civil state, because the current Croatian Constitution in itself defines it as a state of the Croats, i.e. as a national state, and not a modern state of its citizens. Should Croatia remain a national state, the Serb nation will be forced to organize a referendum to show the will of the Serbs.

FYROM: Agreement on Normalization of Ties to FRY

AU1604193596 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 10 Apr 96 p 3

[Text of the agreement on normalization of relations between the FRY and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, signed in Belgrade on 8 April: "Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("Parties"), aware of their responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of peace and security in the region,

Led by the principles of the UN Charter, the Final Acts of the Helsinki and Paris Charters,

With the desire to promote good relations between their citizens and peoples,

And with the desire to contribute with this to the regulation of bilateral relations,

Have agreed the following:

Article 1. The Parties will exist as independent states within their international borders.

Article 2. Each Party will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the other Party. The Parties confirm that the disputes will be solved in a peaceful way and that they will refrain from the threats and the use of force, in accordance with the UN Charter. The Parties will try to strengthen mutual trust, goodwill, and tolerance, and will work together on the promotion of peace, good-neighborliness, and stability in the region.

The two Parties will form a joint diplomatic-expert commission within 30 days of the signing of this Agreement. The commission will prepare a draft of an international agreement, which will describe in words where the joint state border lies and include as its integral part a map depicting a joint state border.

The two Parties will then sign the draft international agreement.

Article 3. With the signing of this Agreement, the Parties are establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

Article 4. Proceeding from the fact that Serbia and Montenegro had existed as independent states before the creation of Yugoslavia, and bearing in mind the fact that Yugoslavia will continue the international-legal status of these states, the Republic of Macedonia will recognize [pocituva] the state continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Proceeding from the fact that the Macedonian people decided during the People's Liberation War and at ASNOM [Anti-Fascist Assembly of People's Liberation of Macedonia] to establish the Republic of Macedonia as a state, and to stay in the Yugoslav federation, and bearing in mind the fact that the Macedonian people at the 1991 referendum decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state, and appreciating the fact that this has been achieved in a peaceful way, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will recognize the state continuity of the Republic of Macedonia.

The Parties agree to settle their mutual claims concerning succession of the former SFRY through mutual agreement.

Article 5. The Parties will respect fully the rights of the members of the national minorities within their borders, in accordance with the highest international standards.

Article 6. The Parties will work on improving road, railroad, and air links, as well as on the post, telephone, telegraph, and other types of communications. The Parties will refrain from imposing any obstructions on the movement of people and goods between their territories or through the territory of one or the other Party. The Parties will work together to facilitate this movement in accordance with the international law and customs.

Article 7. Aiming to strengthen and intensify economic and commercial ties in all spheres, including industrial cooperation, the Parties will immediately start negotiations on reaching an agreement on economic cooperation and trade with the aim of developing mutually beneficial economic and trade relations. The Parties will also, on a reciprocal basis, agree to settle the issue of property of the legal and physical entities.

Article 8. The Parties will cooperate in preserving and protecting the environment and especially in eliminating of all types of excessive pollution. The Parties will strive toward the development and coordination of the strategy and programs for the regional and international cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection. Acknowledging the importance of these aims, the Parties will start immediately with the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement in the near future on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection.

The Parties will be develop and improve cooperation in the sphere of health and will work on preventing the spread of animal and plant diseases.

Article 9. The Parties will cooperate in the protection and preservation of objects of cultural heritage on the basis of international law. The Parties will promote cultural relations and will stimulate and support all forms of cultural exchanges. Regarding these issues, the Parties will start immediately on the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on cultural cooperation.

The Parties will develop and promote cooperation in the sphere of sports.

Article 10. The Parties will develop and promote scientific-technical cooperation. They will facilitate the exchange of information for scientific and technical documentation and will strive to improve mutual access to the scientific and research institutions, archives, libraries, and similar institutions. To this aim, the Parties will start to negotiate immediately in order to speed up an agreement on scientific-technical cooperation.

Article 11. This agreement has been made in two originals, in the Macedonian and Serbian language, and they are both of equal importance.

This agreement will be applied on the day of signing, and will take effect when the two Parties inform each other through diplomatic channels that their official organs have endorsed it.

Signed on 8 April 1996 in Belgrade.

On behalf of the Republic of Macedonia, Ljubomir Frckovski,

On behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Milan Milutinovic.

FYROM: FRY Recognition, Education Policy Questioned

AU1604203896 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by B.R.: "Recognition and Education"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje—The two problems of the recent recognition between Skopje and Belgrade and of the education of the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] remain at the center of public attention here. The Albanian deputies in the Macedonian parliament yesterday raised the issue of the mutual recognition of the self-styled FRY and Macedonia. Rufi Osmani asked: How did this happen at a time when the stand of the Party of Democratic Prosperity on the Republic of Kosova is well known? Sefedin Haruni asked: Does this not mean recognition of greater Serbia? Sali Ramadani asked: Does this mean recognition of the entire FRY, including the Republic of Kosova? Such questions from Albanian deputies at the most recent meeting of the Macedonian parliament seem to imply that the parliament, or at least its Albanian deputies, were not informed of the decision that Albania would recognize Serbia and Montenegro.

The second problem, of education, has also been commented on in different political circles in Macedonia. The Albanian deputies have asked in parliament for the recognition and acceptance of diplomas from the universities of Albania and the University of Prishtina, while such Macedonian deputies such as Tomislav Stoyanovski have even asked for those who employ graduates of the University of Prishtina to be brought to book! The question has also arisen of why the government does not cooperate with the University of Tetovo. An answer was provided by Foreign Minister Frckovski, not in parliament, but at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, which, as the media here report, have stressed that the Macedonian Government will not in any event permit the creation of parallel systems of education, because these create ghettos. It will, therefore, not grant official standing to the Tetovo initiative. The other problem preoccupying Albanian education in Macedonia recently has been the opening of competitions for the registration of pupils at secondary schools. The Naim Frasheri League of Albanian Teachers in Macedonia [Lidhja e Arsimtareve Shqiptare ne Maqedoni] expressed its strong indignation at the competition this year because the Education Ministry had not heeded the Albanians demands on defining the number of Albanian-language streams to be created. What this means in practice can perhaps best be seen in the example of the Zef Lush Marku High School in Skopje. Asked to create 17 Albanian-language streams, the Education Ministry recommended no more than eight.

While these two problems continue to preoccupy the public, the problem of the so-called Religious Community of Muslims of Macedonia [Bashkesia Fetare e Myslimaneve te Maqedonise], launched by Yakup Selimovski in the last few days, received an official reply with the removal of this organization of Mr. Selimovski from the list of religious communities in Macedonia. The decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 19 March in fact supports the appeal of the meshiat [governing council] of the Islamic Community of Macedonia [Bashkesia Islame e Maqedonise], whose leader is Efendi [honorary title] Rexhepi, and which remains the sole legitimate Islamic community in the whole of Macedonia.

Poland: Solana: Decision on NATO Entry Probable in 1997

LD1604200896 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who is arriving in Poland tomorrow, has confirmed that a decision on Polish membership in the Atlantic alliance will most probably be made next year. Solana, however, who has given an interview to PAP and Polish Television news, did not wish to give a specific date when this decision would be made.

[begin recording] [Solana, captioned, in English with superimposed Polish translation] This decision will probably be made in 1997. I have already said this, and I would like to say it again. But the important thing is that we should continue our bilateral dialogue even more deeply over the whole of 1996. And, of course, we will continue to expand our relations through the Partnership for Peace program.

[Jacek Safuta, PAP correspondent in Brussels, captioned, in English with superimposed Polish translation] Is NATO not worried about the process of renewed unification that is apparently taking place in the former USSR, and also by strange ideas about some sort of corridor?

[Solana] When a sovereign country freely makes a decision about whether it wishes to be in a military or political alliance, it has to be respected. The future of European security must be built on the will of sovereign and free countries. This is why we demand that the decisions made by your or other countries on joining NATO should be respected. Your country thinks this is the best way of defending its interests, and we have to respect this, everybody has to respect this. [end recording]

[Announcer] [Passage omitted] Polish politicians expect the visit by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to confirm that Poland will be one of the first countries that can count on joining the North Atlantic alliance. Some expect that fresh declarations will be made, while others think that none will be made until the June elections in Russia.

[begin recording] [Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party, captioned] We expect this to be the last visit by the secretary general before political decisions are made this year about Poland's joining the defense structures of the Western world.

[Bronislaw Geremek of the Freedom Union, captioned] Javier Solana's decision is taking place precisely at a time when one should not expect any new political initiatives before the Russian presidential elections.

[Piotr Naimski of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, captioned] We would like the NATO secretary general to say in Warsaw that Poland is considered to be one of the top contenders to be invited. We would also like him to define a time when this decision might be made.

[Jerzy Szmajdzinski of the Democratic Left Alliance, caption] All quarters are saying virtually the same thing in this matter. But I think it is very vital for the NATO secretary general to convince himself in person about this. [end recording]

Poland: Wilecki on Adapting Defense to NATO Standards

WS1604131896 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 16 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "Let the Civilians Rule, Says the General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *[Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces] General Tadeusz Wilecki evaded the question by a SZTANDAR reporter of whether he supports the dismantling of our autonomous defense system and adapting it to NATO standards before our membership in the alliance.*

Wilecki said he supports the idea of singling out and training special divisions that would cooperate with NATO. He claims we will be a credible partner once we have an efficient and strong army. Ensuring state security and wisely managing the Armed Forces is a task for civilian politicians.

Wilecki confirmed that part of the Sokol multipurpose aircraft ordered by the Armed Forces from the aviation plant in Swidnik will be bartered to the Czech Republic in exchange for the 10 MiG-29 planes Poland received. We owe Prague a total of 11 brand-new helicopters. The Czechs are due to receive half of them by September 1996. Our Armed Forces will hand over its newly acquired aircraft and wait to receive its own until the end of the year, when the contract with the Swidnik plant expires.

On the eve of the 50th Sapper Day, celebrated since World War II, Wilecki visited the 2d Mazovian Sapper Brigade in Kazun. Senior officers inquired about pensions, and younger ones asked for more money to train soldiers. Each day two clearing patrols of the Brigade neutralize duds on construction sites in Warsaw and five neighboring voivodships. As we learned from Colonel Janusz Lalka, chief of the Brigade, his men neutralized a bomb planted by the allied forces during World War II in Piastow [near Warsaw].

Poland: Daily on Kwasniewski's Russian Visit, Relations

WS1704094596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 13-14 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Grzegorz Jankowski: "What Was the Visit For?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Kwasniewski's visit to Russia did not bring any tangible results. This does not mean it was a failure. It is positive that the newly elected president treats relations with our eastern neighbor very seriously.

It was very fortunate that the president began his visit by paying tribute to Polish officers murdered in Katyn and closed it with a trip to the descendants of Polish expatriates in Siberia, which we have all but forgotten.

It is good that the incumbent president warded off Yeltsin's criticism of former President Walesa.

Nevertheless, the course of the visit and its meager results do raise a number of questions. No significant agreements were signed—for example, on military cooperation or on readmission (providing for the extradition of Russians who live in Poland illegally or who have committed criminal offenses). Most important, Kwasniewski failed to persuade the Russians to change their stance on our joining NATO.

The president argues that the object of the visit was to normalize our relations with Russia and prove that, apart from NATO, nothing really divides us.

If so, why have no major agreements between our two states been signed? It was clear that Poland and Russia cannot reach an agreement on NATO, at least not at this time.

It seems that the main beneficiary of the visit was Yeltsin himself. In two months he will run for a second term of office. He can now tell his fellow countrymen: "See, nearly the entire world supports me. The EU gives Russia loans as long as I am president, Clinton supports me, and now the president of Poland, the most important state in Central Europe, has come to support me."

Kwasniewski satisfied expectations very well. He invited Yeltsin to visit Poland next year. He also wished him luck in the coming presidential elections.

What if the communist Zyuganov wins? Will Kwasniewski visit the Kremlin once again to invite the new Russian president to Poland? The West can afford to support Yeltsin openly. Poland cannot, if at least for the reason that we share a border with Russia and that Zyuganov might become our president's partner in two months. Moreover, Yeltsin has not been overly friendly toward us recently.

It is not a very good idea to visit a country during the time of a very heated stage of an election campaign. This is not a practice employed by other heads of state. They do not want to be accused of endorsing any of the candidates. They patiently wait for the results of the elections. It seems that Kwasniewski did not learn anything from the lesson of Senate Speaker Adam Struzik, who came under criticism from all sides for visiting Slovakia one week before the parliamentary elections last year.

Talks on Polish membership in NATO also raise many doubts. There is the question of whether Kwasniewski should try to persuade the Russians at all costs that they should make a concession, and whether the issue should be a major topic of discussion between the two leaders. Poland has stressed very clearly on numerous occasions that our membership in NATO does not pose a threat to Russia. Such a statement coming from a sovereign state should suffice. Further requests for approval do not make sense. We do not need Moscow's consent and cannot apply for it. It is a question of our sovereignty.

Kwasniewski gave the impression he was trying to soften the issue. He said NATO would make the decision of whether to expand in some time. Things might change in the meantime. Besides, he added, Poland cannot be a frontline state.

These statements might alarm our potential allies in the West. They do not stress our will and determination to adapt to Western standards firmly enough. They might also be a cause of alarm for the Russians, who might conclude that our decisions are not final.

Kwasniewski's statement that integration between Russia and Belarus is in line with European trends and complies with the general trend of West European integration is, to say the least, unfortunate. Belarus is losing its sovereignty and forsaking its own state identity. This is tantamount to the reconstruction of an empire. One can hardly compare a Russian or Soviet empire with the EU. Thus, Kwasniewski's declarations invite the interpretation that he approves of what is going on between Belarus and Russia. However, the absorption of Belarus by Russia is definitely against Poland's state interests. It is also beginning to provoke protests in Belarus itself. In this context, it should be viewed as even more unfortunate.

Regardless of all of this, the question still remains: Why did Kwasniewski go to Moscow?

Poland: Sejm Speaker Zych Interviewed on Various Issues

WS1604143996 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 5 Apr 96

[Interview with Polish Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych, by Alicja Daniluk-Jankowska; place and date not given: "Sejm Speaker's Easter Holiday"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Jankowska] The question of safety has been a hot issue for the past weeks. Everybody is discussing it; you have held a number of talks on this matter lately, too. What are your conclusions?

[Zych] I have met with the internal affairs minister, the police chief, representatives of the Warsaw Polytechnic authorities, and student organizations. The police chief has presented concrete postulates to the Sejm. In the future, an amendment to the law on possession of firearms and amendments in the "Rules of the Road," which put restrictions on vehicle registration, as well as a modification of the penal law will be made. If the bills are presented to the Sejm, we will consider them on a priority basis. Apart from this, Police Chief Stanczyk appealed to the minister of finance to withdraw from collecting the VAT [value-added tax] and duty on the imported equipment for the police. I support this idea because it would enable the police to earmark these savings for other needs. I guess the most important thing, however, is the coordination of the police, the prosecutor's office, and courts' activities. This is a question of adopting a joint policy against the crime threat, a policy clearly favored by the social atmosphere.

I have agreed with the internal affairs minister that we will meet once a month so that we can determine to try to solve matters as they arise.

[Jankowska] Did you discuss parliamentary control over the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special services? How do you size it up?

[Zych] A concrete result of the conversation with Minister Siemiatkowski is his assurance that, in the future, any changes in the leadership of the Office of State Protection [UOP] will be consulted with the Sejm. A similar statement, pertinent to the Military Information Service, has been made by Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski. Generally, parliamentary supervision over these services is being extended.

[Jankowska] Do you know the name of the new UOP head?

[Zych] No, I do not. I was not interested in it because it is known that the minister will present it to the Sejm soon.

[Jankowska] President Kwasniewski summed up 100 days of his presidency lately. How would you assess your cooperation with the new president? How does it differ from cooperation with Lech Walesa?

[Zych] I do not want to make an attempt to assess it because I do not analyze these questions every day. All I can say is that I meet the president on a regular basis before and after [foreign] visits to coordinate foreign policy. There are no problems with this. On the other hand, I cannot complain about cooperation with Lech Walesa. My talks with him were slightly different and a little more difficult, but I never encountered any problems.

[Jankowska] By the way, about Lech Walesa... What do you think about his return to the shipyard?

[Zych] Please forgive me, but this is his personal business. If he wants to work, let him work. However, let us look at the problem from a different perspective. The Sejm is now being blamed for having failed to settle the issue of remuneration for the former presidents. Please note that neither Wojciech Jaruzelski nor Lech Walesa nor Aleksander Kwasniewski has presented a legislative initiative to the Sejm on this issue. Similarly, other governments never displayed an interest in this. Not until 19 January of this year did the deputies take the initiative. As early as 28 March, the Sejm committee submitted a report on this matter. So we can speak of solving the issue quite expeditiously. The Sejm will definitely solve the issue on Thursday [11 April], after the Easter holiday. Former presidents will probably receive 100 percent of the head of state's salary. Then the law will be sent to the Senate and, if the president signs it promptly, the problem is solved.

[Jankowska] What is the chance that the present National Assembly will adopt the constitution?

[Zych] I am convinced that we will establish it this year. It is not known, however, if it will be adopted in a general referendum.

[Jankowska] The issue that stirs up much controversy is the so-called parliamentary tourism. Senate Speaker Adam Struzik is a record holder when it comes to the number of official trips abroad.

[Zych] In fact, the deputies are lagging behind the senators on this score. As far as the Sejm is concerned, the question of foreign trips is settled. We receive a lot of invitations. Pragmatism and priorities of foreign policy, however, decide about their selection. My travels do not have anything to do with tourism. There is no time for that during the intervals between frequent talks. On a great number of occasions, I have turned down oposals to go abroad, anyway. The others did travel. I have no such inclinations. [passage omitted]

Poland: Sejm Discusses Draft of Social Security System Reform

WS1704104796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13-14 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk and Jerzy Pilczynski: "The Sejm on the Draft of the Social Security Reform; Three Elements of the Pension"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The governmental draft of the social security system reform was the main topic discussed at the Friday [12 April] sitting of the Sejm. Earlier, at the same sitting, the Sejm passed a law on the merging and grouping of some banks operating as shareholders' companies as well as a law on the rights of former presidents.

In line with the draft of the social security system reform, retirement benefits would depend on three elements: the basic pension, depending on the length of employment and on wages; profits from voluntary pension funds; and saving deposits in banks or insurance companies.

The pension benefit would be calculated on the basis of wages earned over the 20 years that were the most favorable during the entire employment period. The premium would be deducted from all wages smaller than 250 percent of the average wage. In the case of higher wages, the premium would not be deducted from a sum above this level.

The premiums would be divided between the employer and the employee. The current social security fund would be divided into the following funds: a pension fund, a sick-leave fund, a maternity fund, an invalid fund, an accident fund, a pension fund for people working in special conditions, and an administrative fund.

The government proposes introducing a new system of valorizing pension benefits in 1997. The valorization index would be agreed every year in negotiations to ensure an increase in benefits that would not be lower than the predicted price increase and not higher than the predicted increase in the average wage.

Moreover, the government proposes reviewing people's right to receive earlier retirement pensions and making the womens' retirement age equal to mens' at age 65.

While presenting the draft of the social security system reform in the Sejm, Labor Minister Andrzej Baczkowski said that the last proposal is controversial, and, for this reason, the government intends to put it into effect gradually. The regulation that sets a woman's retirement age at 60 would be in force until the year 2002. Over the next 10 years—that is, until 2012—women's retirement age would be extended by six months each year.

As part of the program of family benefits financed by the state budget, the government envisions a special social allowance for people who look after handicapped children.

Invalid benefits would be granted only if it were determined that a person is unable to regain his or her ability to work by means of available rehabilitation methods.

The government also intends to carry out a reform of the peasants' social security system. It proposes that the lowest retirement pension, which constitutes the basic sum for calculating the premium for individual peasants, be replaced with the lowest wage. Moreover, the premium would vary, depending on the incomes of a given farm or its size.

Minister Baczkowski stressed that the reform would be carried out over 10 to 15 years, but it definitely must be started in the immediate future to prevent the social security system from collapsing. Within the next few months, the Sejm will receive drafts of specific laws that are indispensable to carrying out the reform: on principles of valorizing the pension benefits, on social benefits for families, on pension funds, on rationalization of the right to receive earlier retirement pension, on social insurance for accidents at work and occupational diseases.

During the discussion, parliamentary clubs submitted a number of reservations to the document presented by the government. The most frequently voiced criticism was that the draft was too general. Wieslawa Ziolkowska [of the Union of Labor] noted that it is difficult to discuss the reform if one does not know its details. Opposition deputies argued that voluntary insurance programs would be available only to the richest people, whereas the others only would receive benefits envisioned by the compulsory insurance plans. In addition, they claimed that in fact the government's document is a proposal to improve the existing pension system, whereas it should be a thorough and sweeping reform of the social security system.

Poland: Appointment of Public Television Head Criticized

WS1604141996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13-14 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Bozena Wawrzewska: "Public Television—Party Television"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The appointment of Ryszard Miazek to president of public television is not good news. Apart from the issue of the appointee himself and his skills to run the board of a type of commercial company like Polish Television SA [TVP], he was selected not on the basis of professional prowess, but according to a party criteria. Public television is thus headed by a representative of a specific party, one that is part of the governing coalition. He is neither a businessman nor a representative of television, but a politician. The new TVP president's opinion that his function is a "job for a real man," as Ryszard Miazek himself put it, does not seem to be a sufficient recommendation. This is a job for a very skilled professional.

Buying votes and bargaining for seats on the board—so many for the Democratic Left Alliance, so many for the Polish Peasant Party, so many for the Union [unspecified], so many for the Christian-National Union—at the price of support for this or the other candidate for TVP president, attempts at combining the appointment of Walendziak's successor with the new licensing process indicates that, as far as programming is concerned, public television will soon cease to be what it should be—public property. It will now be a party television, political television.

The most important criteria in the process of appointing the new TVP board was the candidates' political orientation and which party could secure the largest possible number of seats on the board at what price. Who, depending upon who sits on the board, will be appointed the TVP head, and who will be granted the next television license by way of compensation?

The National Radio and Television Council and the TVP Supervisory Board—institutions established to safeguard the independence of electronic media and supervise the activities of a commercial company—were sides in the party games. The concern for their own survival as well as their own or party interests overshadowed their statutory obligation of guaranteeing that television be free from political pressure and ensuring efficient economic performance.

Television is a very specific medium. Anyone who has had anything to do with it knows its power. It is more prone to various forms of pressure than any other media. Attempts are continually made to exert influence on it, to impose one's own views and program concepts. It takes a lot of effort to resist that pressure. Independence from party connections is needed. One can hardly expect that from individuals who themselves are dependent on political parties. One can rather expect that the pressure exerted by parties on public television will grow.

Poland: Unification Efforts of Right Wing Viewed

WS1704115996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by M.D.Z. and P.W.R.: "How Broad Can a Solidarity Election Bloc Be? The Freedom Union as the Bone of Contention"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The parties of the anticommunist camp that have their roots in Solidarity are declaring today that they are prepared to form a broad coalition or at least to prepare a common electoral list. What raises doubts, however, is the following question: How far to the left can such a bloc reach? Today, nearly all reject the possibility of cooperating with the Union of Labor [UP]; many groups assess that the chance of cooperating with the Freedom Union [UW] is "not very big."*

The UW itself is trying not to discourage any potential partners, and, even though its activists are saying that they would not find it easy to put their names on lists that would include Zygmunt Wrzodak [a radical Solidarity activist], for the time being they do not want to limit the negotiating possibilities by making any official statements.

The ROP: With the Strong Ones, Without UW

The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] wants to build a broad camp of independet-oriented parties that would include nearly all of the Solidarity forces. However, ROP submits two conditions: First, it intends to hold talks only with strong parties, which Jan Olszewski believes are limited exclusively to peasant groups and to Solidarity; second, it does not want to make any deals with those who are responsible for the return of the communists to power. In this case, the ROP leader means primarily UW. "I believe that the idea of forming a broad alliance with UW is risky," the former prime minister says, and the spokesman of his party adds that "the rightist electorate will never agree to an alliance with UW because today this party is the closest and the staunchest ally of the Democratic Left Alliance." After Marian Pilka was elected chairman of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], Jan Olszewski spoke very warmly of him. He stressed the ideological similarities. However, he immediately added that he does not count the ZChN among the leading forces in the country today.

The ZChN: With the Small Ones, Without UW

According to ZChN leaders, their party, which is slowly regaining its influence, also considers Solidarity to be its potential primary partner. The ZChN leader has already held two meetings with Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski (the second meeting took place yesterday in Gdansk). First, Pilka would like to form (perhaps as soon as May) a closely cooperating coalition of several parties with similar views (the ZChN, the Party of Christian Democrats—PChD, the Conservative Coalition—KK, the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord—PSL-PL) and then incorporate it into a larger bloc in which there would be enough room for all of the right-wing parties, even the smallest ones. Such a bloc, which would count on support from the voters of Lech Walesa and Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, should not have one clear-cut leader, Pilka believes. However, the ZChN chairman excludes the possibility of forming an alliance with the parties that are cooperating with the left wing in the self-government structures, nor does he envision an alliance with those whose Sejm deputies support the idea of liberalizing the antiabortion law—that is, UP and UW. According to Pilka, the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] are parties that "are going through a deep internal crisis."

The KK, SLCh: Under Walesa's Patronage

KK leaders support the idea of forming a closely cooperating bloc with the ZChN, the PChD, and the PSL-PL. However, they believe that cooperation with ROP and Solidarity is also important. [KK leader] Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski thinks that Lech Walesa might contribute to the unification of the right wing, not as a leader, however, but as a living symbol.

Leaders of the Peasant-Christian Party [SLCh] are also inclined to agree to Walesa's patronage over the right wing's common electoral list. According to SLCh Chairman Artur Balazs, a broad anticommunist camp should be established under the patronage of the former president. "It would provide enough room for the ZChN, Solidarity, and ROP," says Balazs. However, he does not hide the fact that his party feels closest to UW, the Conservative Party, the Republicans, and the Democratic Party, groups that recently concluded a platform agreement.

Lech Walesa Urges

Lech Walesa has recently been telling right wing leaders to hurry up. He hints that, unless they reach agreement quickly, he will start acting himself.

The "United in Elections," a group established early this year by Jerzy Gwizdz, aspires to unite the electorate of Lech Walesa before the parliamentary elections. Boguslaw Kowalski, spokesman of the "United in Elections," speaks about the broadest possible coalition based on a common platform: "It is certainly necessary to talk with ROP; things will be more difficult with UW." However, he does not completely rule out the latter.

Both groups severely criticized Lech Walesa, but the platform of UW differs more widely from Walesa's views than the platform of the "United in Elections."

"It would be possible to come to an understanding on the platform with ROP," Kowalski says.

According to him, it would be a considerable success to attract the post-Solidarity parties to three blocs grouped around Lech Walesa, Jan Olszewski, and UW. Then further integration efforts might be made.

"Solidarity might play a major role at this stage because there are supporters of each of the three people in it," Kowalski says.

The BBWR, another group that supports Lech Walesa, also shows great reserve in relations with UW. As [BBWR leader] Andrzej Gasinnica-Makowski says, BBWR would like for UW to set up a socioliberal bloc with which the right wing would sign a preelection nonaggression pact.

The PC: the Anticommunist Minimum

Jaroslaw Kaczynski believes that only cooperation with UP is impossible. The Center Accord [PC] leader is holding talks with both the activists of ROP and of the right-wing faction of UW, although he fears "troubles with this portion of the party." Kaczynski wants to build a joint electoral list on the basis of a platform referred to as "the anticommunist minimum." The main forces of such a bloc would be the parties that managed to prepare their own electoral lists in the 1993 parliamentary elections (that is, the PC, the ZChN, and UW), although ROP, which was established later, should also be taken into consideration. "However, one should not be guided by the results of public opinion polls," Jaroslaw Kaczynski believes.

Romania: Foreign Minister on NATO Expansion, Issues

AU1604142096 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 8 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by D.D. Rujan; place and date not given: "Integration in the Euro-Atlantic Structures Remains the Main Coordinate of Our Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Rujan] Mr. Minister, you participated in the Prague meeting, where U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the process of new affiliations to NATO will continue despite Russia's opposition. How should one interpret this: as a reiteration of a principled option or as an endorsement for efficient integration steps?

[Melescanu] I believe that the statement you referred to covers both meanings of your question. On the one hand, the United States is reiterating its determination to continue the process of NATO's "opening" and revitalization, a process which will lie at the foundation of the European security system in the next century. When I refer to "opening," I am thinking both of the process of NATO's expansion and to the parallel process of developing relations of partnership and cooperation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the other countries which have expressed a desire to adhere to the alliance.

At the same time, through the emphasis put on the deliberate, gradual, and transparent nature of this process, which must take place in accordance with the established timetable, this statement also amounts to an effective support for the efforts of the countries in central and eastern Europe—implicitly, of Romania, too—along the road of integration. [passage omitted]

[Rujan] The recent vote in Russia's Duma has created some commotion in our country, too. Some people think that the new Soviet Union is already in the making, while others believe that the gesture has no big relevance. How do you see it, in your capacity as head of Romanian diplomacy?

[Melescanu] One should assess the position of Russia's State Duma from both a legal and a political viewpoint.

From a legal viewpoint, the document has no impact whatsoever on Russia's relations with the other states of the former Soviet Union, because the cancellation of the decision on the USSR's dissolution must be done by all sides, not only by Russia. As a matter of fact, certain commentaries in Moscow point out that, through this resolution, the Duma is denying its own legality, since it thus becomes an institution of a state that has emerged in the wake of an act devoid of legal force. It is also known that the federal government officially stated that the declaration has no relevance on the foreign policy, decisions, or commitments of the Russian Federation.

From a political viewpoint, the declaration reveals the spread of a certain nostalgia for a structure which has already been refuted by the ex-Soviet nations; consequently, it can be perceived as a danger for the independence of the former Soviet republics.

However, we must emphasize that important forces in Russia, the democratic forces, have rejected this attempt to turn back the wheel of history. [passage omitted] Therefore, the consolidation of Russia's democratic evolution is the best guarantee against such trends, and we should focus our efforts on supporting this process.

[Rujan] If we were to judge by the assurances received from various Western guests, Romania can consider itself as already having more than one foot in the EU. How optimistic should we be, in view of our official adherence endeavors and the real predisposition of "the 15"?

[Melescanu] Romania, like the other central and east European countries, was encouraged in its endeavors to adhere to the EU by the conclusions of the European Council of Copenhagen, according to which the associated countries willing and fulfilling the political, economic, and social conditions can become members of the EU. [passage omitted] Romania positively assesses the fact that the dominant attitude in the EU is not to introduce hierarchies with regard to the sequence of the integration of candidates, but to leave it to the individual performance of the candidate countries. [passage omitted]

Apropos the second part of your question, we can say that there is a real readiness on the part of "the 15" to accept Romania as a member. This entitles us to be optimistic, but we must display a realistic kind of optimism, because the speed of integration primarily depends on the seriousness with which we are going to implement the national strategy on preparing our EU adherence and mastering the Community experience. [passage omitted]

[Rujan] You have had, for the second time, a three-way meeting with your counterparts from Bulgaria and Greece. Are you planning a kind of "Balkan trilateral"? As for the projected bridge over the Danube, the issue is still pending. Why?

[Melescanu] As you know, a meeting between the foreign ministers of Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria took place in Varna on 16-17 March this year. The agenda of the talks dealt with the cooperation among the three countries, particularly in the economic sphere and the completion of various infrastructure projects. It also facilitated an exchange of views on matters pertaining to the regional security and on combating illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and organized crime as basic prerequisites for ensuring stability and prosperity throughout the region. [passage omitted] Within this framework, the sides also discussed the location of a bridge across the Danube, with both the Romanian and Bulgarian sides agreeing on the need to continue the discussions, at the level of experts, in order to harmonize the two positions.

Regarding the future of the "trilateral," we pointed out in Varna, too, that Romania does not consider this kind of meeting as exclusive, since we are not talking here about a "restricted club," but rather we want to attract further countries interested in cooperating for the implementation of various infrastructure projects. In this respect, it was suggested that Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia should be invited in a first stage, since these countries ensure the continuity of the trans-Balkan transport routes toward western Europe.

[Rujan] It seems that the West is showing some impatience toward the issue of the conclusion of treaties between Romania and its neighbors, particularly the "four ones." What is the stage of the ongoing negotiations? What is still missing for these documents to be actually signed?

[Melescanu] As you know, the negotiations on the conclusion of the basic political treaties with Hungary, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia have not yet been finalized. With the Republic of Moldova, the negotiations on the Treaty of Fraternity and Integration are still at an exploration stage. The basic political treaty with Russia has been practically negotiated. All that is left is to establish the way in which the treaty, or a separate document, will reflect the common assessments of the two sides regarding the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. [passage omitted] I must emphasize here that the solution of the pending problems can only be made with the contribution of both sides to the respective treaty. I believe that we Romanians have proven our flexibility and taken the necessary steps, in all situations, to meet halfway the positions of our partners. We have also shown openness toward the proposals put forward by our partners. I believe that it is in the interest of all of us to conclude these treaties which, in the current international circumstances, will represent "gains" for each one of us.

It is worth mentioning here our concept on the place and role of the basic political treaties which we have already signed with 18 European countries. These are legal and political documents that express the determination of our country and partners to base our future relations on the law-governed principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act as well as on the principles and values upon which the European structures were created. [passage omitted]

The bilateral treaties are not peace treaties concluded at the end of wars. Therefore, and we hope to be properly understood in this respect, the question does not arise of establishing new borders, asking for reparations, or eliminating and correcting certain past injustices.

In these treaties, we proceed from observing the inviolability of existing borders, which have been established by the currently valid peace treaties. Whether we reiterate this situation in the treaty or not, the reality remains unchanged. Therefore, from this viewpoint, these treaties are not an instrument for territorial changes, nor an instrument for internal political changes within the signatory states.

I believe it is quite obvious that there are no political or legal realities which can deny this fact and that the status and situation of the minorities in each country will continue to depend on the laws of that country and on the implementation of the standards and commitments freely assumed in multilateral documents, such as those adopted by the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], and the Council of Europe. We can take over and reconfirm the extant international standards on the issue of minorities in our bilateral treaties. The establishment of additional norms, which go beyond the internationally recognized ones, can only be done—as a function of the particular situation of the respective citizens—through the legislation of each country.

[Rujan] Mr. Minister, some Romanians, and not only those from the opposition, reproach our diplomacy for a certain dose of passivity in defending certain national rights that have been impaired by adverse circumstances. What is the actual situation in this respect?

[Melescanu] Of course, there is room for improvement in this sphere, like in others, too. However, allow me to point out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its missions and its representatives are paying particular attention to the problems of Romanian ethnics living in the neighboring countries, or further away. In this respect, I would like to point out that the relations with the Romanians beyond the borders are one of the main directions of the ministry's activity. Generally speaking, the activity in this field focuses on two objectives: First, to introduce certain provisions in the bilateral documents, including the basic ones, which—while attesting to the loyalty of the Romanian ethnics to the state in which they live—should secure for them an equal treatment to that of the native citizens. [passage omitted] Second, we strive to grant direct support—which is obviously insufficient, given our rather limited financial possibilities—to the organizations of Romanian ethnics abroad, through donations of books and school manuals; by granting the Romanian ethnics the opportunity to study in Romania; by sponsoring certain actions initiated by Romanian organizations and associations; and by supporting the printing of certain publications of the Romanian minorities. [passage omitted]

[Rujan] We are among the initiators and main promoters of the cooperation in the Black Sea zone. We even hosted a prestigious conference of this organization. However, it seems that it evinces certain signs of stagnation, due to a shortage of financial means...

[Melescanu] Indeed, Romania is among the main promoters of the expansion of economic cooperation among the states of the Black Sea basin, as part and parcel of the processes of European integration. In its almost four years of existence, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation [CEMN] has covered an important distance in laying the necessary foundation for the development of a dynamic economic cooperation in this important region, which is rich in resources, intellectual skills, and cultural and spiritual values. [passage omitted] Likewise, we have created an adequate institutional structure to promote this cooperation. Hence I do not believe that one can talk about a stagnation of CEMN. On the contrary, I believe that we are now at the stage of transition from the exploration and identification of cooperation possibilities and potential to the implementation of concrete projects and programs for regional cooperation and development. In this respect, the meeting of the foreign ministers of CEMN countries and the Businessmen's Forum on Economic Cooperation in the Black Sea Zone, which will take place in Bucharest at the end of this month are of particular importance. These two events will mark the CEMN's development directions in the coming years and will also stimulate the interest of businessmen and of certain international economic and financial institutions in participating in the elaboration and execution of projects in the Black Sea basin. [passage omitted]

Romania: President Comments on Accomplishments, Problems

AU1604170796 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 13 Apr 96 pp 7-8

[Interview granted by Mr. Ion Iliescu, president of Romania, to PRO TV television station interviewer Ilie Serbanescu in Bucharest on 3 March]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Serbanescu] Welcome to PRO TV, Mr. President! You are most welcome both literally and figuratively, because you are not only on our screen, but also in our studios. Since this day, 3 March, is also your birthday, I would like to wish you, Mr. President, many happy returns of the day! To begin with, would you be so kind as to say a few words in general, after which I will put my questions to you?

[Iliescu] First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation. Thank you for the congratulations on my birthday and for the opportunity to have this dialogue. I appreciate the presence of your studio in our public life. [passage omitted]

[Stefanescu] I would like to ask you a direct and open question. Many people believe that President Iliescu, after a pretty long vacillation, has made a sharp turn, as they say in automobile jargon, toward the West. Do you think that this is why President Iliescu is currently being contested, maybe even directly attacked, by those who supported him until now?

[Iliescu] Well, there are two aspects to your question. First, you referred to vacillations and sharp turns. Well, I believe that—after studying my official positions and public statements, beginning with the Romanian revolution document which I made known in the night of 22 December 1989 and continuing with other major occasions, such as the first presentation of my own program after the 1990 elections and the investiture speech before the then elected Parliament—any analyst of good faith referring to our foreign policy orientation, which stipulates our broad opening toward the world and our involvement in the European integration processes, will not see any vacillation or sharp turn in all this period. This is also proven by our entire subsequent evolution, through our drawing closer to the European institutions and integration in the European structures.

In this respect, I believe that 1994 was Romania's European year, when our country joined the European structures. I am referring to our acceptance to the Council of Europe, our association to the EU, and our ties with NATO and the West European Union [WEU]. We participated for the first time in the Essen meeting as an EU associated country. A strategy was presented at that EU summit, namely the EU offer to the associated countries. In my opinion, 1995 marked a major political point in this respect, since it signaled the adherence and political endorsement of all our parliamentary political forces and parliamentary parties for the strategy on Romania's preparations for EU integration. [passage omitted]

The second aspect of your question refers to those forces contesting me; I believe you are doing them an injustice, since they have ceaselessly attacked me for the past six years.

[Serbanescu] I do not think I am doing them any kind of injustice, I am simply saying that, right now—and this is another question I am putting to you—the majority of the attacks against President Ion Iliescu come from the left to the right.

[Iliescu] You see, this notion of left is quite relative.

[Serbanescu] Everything is relative, particularly in Romania.

[Iliescu] Not only in Romania, but particularly in Romania. In other words, what does the left really mean, because I believe that many of those whom you assign to the left of our political spectrum are actually rightists par excellence.

[Serbanescu] Can you be more concrete about that?

[Iliescu] I do not want to be more concrete, but I believe everybody understands very well what I am saying. [passage omitted]

[Serbanescu] Anyhow, if those who criticize you are not from the left, then they are those very people who either supported you or who directly participated in the government until now. This government has willy-nilly deviated from a leftist line, so to say, through the economic measures it took. This would be an explanation. Or is it all an electoral maneuver?

[Iliescu] No. You have linked this matter to your first question, namely the issue of our foreign policy orientation. Well, as far as our foreign policy orientation is concerned, I believe that the Romanian political spectrum, from left to right, has adhered to this basic strategic orientation of ours, which is in keeping with a prerequisite of contemporary life, something one just cannot ignore. Of course, to all this one should add the domestic processes, which generate dissatisfaction in various strata of the population, since the entire transition process has been accompanied by many social costs.

We are entering an election year. Each grouping is trying to accumulate a certain capital. Therefore, certain positions on general problems and on various domestic policy orientations—such as the economic reform and some actions abroad—become the target of criticism, which reflects the various interests of certain political forces engaged in this competition.

[Serbanescu] Mr. President, so far you have not yet announced your intention to run in the elections. Anyhow, you said that if you are going to do it, you would run on behalf of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]. However, the interesting thing is that more candidates have registered for this competition than was the case in previous years. The other interesting thing is that the majority of them belong to the left; despite the qualification you have just made in this respect, I will stick to my statement that they are more to the left than to the right. How do you see this matter? Does it suit you that there are more candidates? Does it suit you that most of them belong to the left?

[Iliescu] Whether I like it or not has no relevance whatsoever. I believe that the emergence of a larger number of candidates is linked to certain interests of the respective parties, which think that the presence of their own candidate in the presidential elections would improve the electoral chances of their parties. Therefore, there is nothing unusual in the presence of a larger number of candidates. [passage omitted]

[Serbanescu] Mr. President, I would like to ask you about certain economic problems, which currently have a greater priority, since so many people are faring so badly. Do you have an idea, so to say, of what is to come? Because this is what the people are mainly interested in, as many promises have been made to them and nothing has yet been accomplished. Many people are faced with very great hardships and they would like to know where the future leads. What can the president tell them in this respect?

[Iliescu] First of all, it is obvious that the restructuring of the national economy is a most difficult and strenuous process and these problems are not singular to the Romanians. In this entire process, which has thoroughly changed Romanian society and the face of Romania, the political changes were done relatively much easier, despite the known confrontations. But we have moved from a totalitarian state to a democratic one, from a closed and frozen society dominated by the monopoly of a single party to an open and multiparty society characterized by the unhampered freedom of expression, manifestation, organization, and so forth. We have set up the structures of a law-governed state, with the separation of powers in the state and the functioning of the state's institutions. This most complex process has unfolded in a relatively clear and transparent way.

Regarding the economic system, it is generally characterized by a great inertia. The change of the national economic structures presupposes accumulation and time. This is a matter which I have actually pointed to in the past, as well. When you talk about promises, I do not think that I have ever allowed myself to make such a thing, that is demagogic promises.

[Serbanescu] We have lived with promises for 25 years.

[Iliescu] No, I am talking about hopes, not promises. [passage omitted] I believe that these six years have brought many changes to our economy, too. Here, we are dealing with two aspects: the restructuring of the economic society, on the one hand, and the material accumulation on the other, the latter being also reflected in the citizen's living standards. [passage omitted]

[Serbanescu] Many of your critics note one thing, namely your attempt—which I would call quite natural—to explain the given circumstances. However, your explanations claim that this is the situation and then the people lose the feeling that President Iliescu can help them with anything. They may no longer care for him doing something just for the sake of something being done. Do you not think that they may punish you in the elections?

[Iliescu] This is a risk which I have assumed from the start. I said in 1990 that those who assume the responsibility of ruling in times of hardships are also assuming the appropriate risks. [passage omitted] In politics, the only correct and efficient position is a realistic attitude and the tackling of reality as it is, with all its complications and so forth.

[Serbanescu] I would mention another topical issue here, namely that many workers have come out into the streets to protest the fact that they did not receive their salaries, because their enterprises, whose electrical supply has been cut, could not operate. [passage omitted]

[Iliescu] At this time, the most serious and difficult phenomenon in the process of economic recovery is the financial blockage, which has reached great proportions. The value of all these pay arrears and mutual debts among the enterprises has exceeded 15,000 billion lei. This problem cannot be solved immediately. Many proposals have been made regarding a chainlike compensation scheme. But this is not possible and it is unrealistic in the conditions of a market economy. The state no longer has any possibilities to solve this problem. It does not have the necessary resources. This is a matter which requires efforts at the macrolevel and the microlevel, particularly at the microlevel, in the economic units themselves. [passage omitted]

[Serbanescu] Mr. President, a last question about your pledge to be a president of all Romanians. How do you think you have fulfilled this pledge?

[Iliescu] I believe that I tried hard to be a man of dialogue in my relations with the citizens and through my openness and receptivity to the problems raised by various social categories. Likewise, in my relations with the state's institutions, I tried to be useful and encourage the dialogue and communications among them as well as the dialogue with the political forces. I believe that we have had some useful and positive experiences in this respect, if I were to mention only a few instances. One of them would be the one referred to at the beginning, when we talked about foreign policy problems. I said then that, on these matters, we have usually found a common language and everybody can see that, despite the differences of opinion—which must naturally exist and do exist in a democratic system—there are also problems on which we can all converge. [passage omitted]

Romania: Government Schedules Local Elections for 2 Jun

AU1604143396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This year's local elections will be held on 2 June, and the electoral campaign will officially start on 19 April—the government decided today at its weekly meeting.

The government also adopted six decisions on the start of the process of local elections: the decision on fixing the date of local councils, county councils, and the mayors; the decision on establishing the measures incumbent upon the government in fulfilling its responsibilities regarding the organization and unfolding of the elections; the decision on approving the calendar of local elections; the decision on expenditures for the preparation and holding of the elections; the decision on numbering the county constituencies; and the decision on establishing the pattern of electoral lists and seals.

At a news conference that followed the government meeting, Mr. Octav Cosmanca, secretary of state and head of the Local Public Administration Department, presented the changes to the Law on Local Elections and the Law on the Local Public Administration, namely: a more exact definition of the principle of local autonomy; the clarification of the competence of the local councils in electing and replacing the deputy mayors; the clear delimitation of the prerogatives of the mayors and deputy mayors; the delimitation of the role of the permanent delegations of the county councils that will be directly elected by the electorate; and other issues.

Regarding the dismissal of mayors, he said that a mayor can be dismissed upon the prefect's proposal, provided that a judge's decision in this respect exists.

Slovenia: Diplomatic Dialogue With Italy Resumes

AU1604204396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ignac Golob held talks with Italian Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Luigi Ferraris in Rome today. The visit comes as a result of the adoption of a platform on rapprochement with Europe by the State Chamber. Here is a report by our Rome correspondent Jure Pengov:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] This was an exclusively informative visit and discussion. The Golob-Ferraris meeting served no other purpose. Italy, as the chairman of the European Union, deserves to be the first to be thoroughly briefed on the views and conclusions of the State Chamber. Following these talks, Italy will convey its impressions to the rest of the EU members and only afterward will these decide on whether the conditions for the signing of the already initialed associate membership agreement have been met.

The Italians questioned our diplomats about the details of Slovenia's intentions regarding the deadlines and contextual stages in the harmonization of our legislation on foreigners' rights to real estate.

The talks were good and useful, Ignac Golob said. When asked whether they also discussed the link between the Brussels agreement and the bilateral open issues, he replied:

[Golob] No, of course not. I was here to hold talks with the president of the European Union and not on a bilateral visit. No, not in the official part of the meeting, however, yes, there were some questions in the informal debate during lunch.

[Pengov] Judging by the satisfaction of our delegation and the contents of the Italian press release on the meeting, the least we can say is that the dialogue of both diplomacies, which was interrupted six months ago, is again underway. [end recording]

Slovenia: Thaler Views EU Aspirations, Croatian Ties

AU1604130896 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 16 Apr 96 p 34

[Interview with Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Norbert Mappes-Niedieck; place and date not given: "Slovenia Is Qualified for EU Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mappes-Niediek] It looks as if the quarrels with Italy, which have set back your country so much over European integration, might be over soon. At the moment the Slovene parliament is discussing a proposal for mediation from Spain. A year and a half ago it seemed as if the unpleasant controversy had been settled. At that time your predecessor, Lojze Peterle, brought back a proposal for agreement from a meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Martino in Aquileia, which was then not accepted in Slovenia. What makes the Spanish proposal more acceptable than the Aquileia agreement?

[Thaler] The most important difference is a matter of principle. Aquileia, where nothing was signed, was an attempt to make a bilateral agreement with strongly unilateral elements, in the spirit of Slovenia's concessions to Italy. The Spanish agreement, on the other hand, is an agreement at a multilateral level, with a basic solution. Slovenia announces that it is prepared to adjust its laws to European standards and gives the assurance that this will be done in two steps. The first step, hand in hand with the ratification of the association agreement with the EU, is the right for all EU citizens who have lived on the territory of what is now the Republic of Slovenia for at least three years to buy real estate here. The second step is opening the real estate market up to EU citizens four years after the ratification of the association agreement, and that with a view to our full membership of the EU. If we are serious in our determination to join the EU, this is a consistent method.

[Mappes-Niediek] Is this now the breakthrough, if you accept the Spanish proposal? Or are other obstacles on the path toward EU membership to be expected?

[Thaler] That is a difficult question. It is not easy for the Italian Government to come to an agreement regarding Slovenia. Therefore, the general climate among the other 15 member countries is so important. Of course, a clear acceptance of the Spanish proposal would help us very much. Slovenia is probably the one central European country that is best qualified for EU membership. However, as a matter of law, Slovenia is behind nine other countries in central and eastern Europe, all of which have signed an association agreement. We must overcome this absurd situation.

[Mappes-Niediek] The quarrel has narrowed down to the question of whether those Italians who left Yugoslavia after World War II may get their real estate back. Is this more a symbolic point or do the Slovenes really expect that large numbers of Italians will buy their houses back?

[Thaler] The issue of the property of the so-called option takers, that is the 20,000 to 25,000 people who left this part of Slovenia after World War II —by the way, not only Italians but also Slovenes, Croats, etc.—has been turned into an instrument by right-wing politicians in Italy. The rational element in it is very small. However, the issue was very useful for the strategy of putting pressure on Slovenia in particular because it has been instrumentalized and politicized to such an extent that it also caused a normal reaction on the Slovene side. Of course, everyone knows that there is no urgent need behind it; for instance, if the option takers did not have roofs over their heads. The issue of returning property was a strategy to force Slovenia to its knees. Slovenia was supposed to admit that it owed Italy something. And that should be so even though so much had happened between the two world wars, when 500,000 Slovenes living under the Mussolini regime had their houses burned down! When so many had to flee to central Slovenia, Argentina, or the United States. Of course, the issue reopened old wounds here. We have actively tried to convince the rational side of Italian politics that it is absurd nowadays to base political goals on issues that are 50 or 60 years old. However, I must admit that we have not been very successful.

[Mappes-Niediek] Now the Slovenes have turned their backs on the Balkans and are standing in front of a closed door. There is a lot of disappointment. What would be the result of a referendum on EU membership?

[Thaler] The majority of voters are still in favor of it. Five years ago the majority was excessively large, now it is normal—about 55-60 percent. Italy is doing counterproductive work for the pro-Europeans in Slovenia. When I advocate pro-European measures such as the adjustment of our laws, this is no longer seen as a step toward integration. From the political side there comes the constant accusation that these are "concessions," that we are "capitulating" to Italy. However, I am optimistic about the referendum, which will probably be held only after the negotiations on full membership have been concluded. The Slovenes did not leave Yugoslavia to become an island in central Europe.

[Mappes-Niediek] This year elections will be held in Slovenia. Do you expect that Europe will become an election campaign issue?

[Thaler] Yes, because it is a constructive issue. The internal political controversy in our country revolves around so-called scandals. People are fed up with this. They trust neither one side nor the other; they do not want to know anything about politics any longer. This is not good. An open, high-quality discussion about Europe, on the other hand, could be something constructive. We are discussing our fate in connection with a really important issue, not along the lines of the communist/anticommunist pattern.

[Mappes-Niediek] Will it be a yes-or-no debate about Europe?

[Thaler] At the moment there is only a debate between yes on the one side and "yes and no" on the other. There is only one deputy who explicitly says no to Europe. All the others insist that they should not be seen as anti-European. They say approximately: "This price is too high. We want to enter Europe with our backs straight. But we are for Europe." Of course, I cannot predict the debate, but perhaps in the end some of the rather national and populist parties will say: Europe yes, but better later. They are for Europe but against the measures that lead there. On the other side there are the Liberal Democrats and the Christian Democrats, who are both for Europe and for consistent measures. The others say yes at the strategic level, but no at the tactical level.

[Mappes-Niediek] Thus, the government is in a rather good position. It has something to offer.

[Thaler] Yes. That is why I am optimistic and also satisfied that the debate has come to the point and is no longer so academic. If we want to go into Europe, we must also jump over our shadow regarding some issues. There are so many stereotypes in the nation's collective psychology. We are small; we have always been squeezed between the Germanic, Roman, and Slav-speaking worlds; foreigners just want to get our land; the land is something sacred. All these fantasies or traumas must be discussed, I think, so that they can be overcome; this is not too simple. There is the conviction that public opinion is conservative. However, over the past weeks it has been shown that the qualified media are strongly pursuing the pro-European line.

[Mappes-Niediek] Are the collective memories of the small, oppressed Slovenia with its weak identity closely linked to the historical debates? For instance, with the quarrel between partisans and collaborators?

[Thaler] I am not happy about such debates; they are not necessary. This schism from the time of 60 years ago exists in many European nations. However, in other places the wounds are not touched. The debate about the land that we have settled is no longer philosophical; a century-old experience is concentrated in it. The discussion about the partisans may have been necessary in 1990 before the first free elections because the issue had been suppressed so much. But it is unnecessary to continue with it.

[Mappes-Niediek] In Austria there are those that want to make the question of a German-speaking minority in Slovenia an issue. Is this an issue in bilateral relations?

[Thaler] No. When such signals came from Vienna for the first time, we agreed with the Austrian Government to establish a joint historians' commission to give an overview of what had happened from the historical point of view. Of course, there are some political forces that want to exploit this issue. But in reality the problem does not exist.

[Mappes-Niediek] Slovenia is a small country with all her four neighbors bigger. What does this mean for foreign policy which had to be invented after independence? Should Slovenia establish particularly close relations with one or more of its neighbors or should it rather try to keep its balance among all of them?

[Thaler] We are trying to have good relations with all our neighbors and we are being rather successful in this. If we ignore the issue of the optants: Italy is our second largest trading partner, the border is completely open, there is enormous traffic both ways, and in cultural terms relations are like relations between France and Germany. Slovenia is particularly interested in participating in the development of efficient mechanisms of collective security. This is the main reason for our Euro-Atlantic orientation. The EU is the best preventive mechanism against a war in Europe and NATO is the only efficient collective security system. Joining such families is the main way for Slovenia, together with its larger neighbors, to guarantee well-being and security. In addition, Slovenia is willing and able to participate fully in these systems. It is not true that someone has to take care of us. This is our option, not an alliance with this or that neighbor.

[Mappes-Niediek] Slovenia is normalizing its relations with the former Yugoslav republics. Recently, to the surprise of many observers, you diplomatically recognized the FRY and you are showing particular interest in the reconstruction of Bosnia, with whose government you have always had good relations. With your direct neighbor, Croatia, on the other hand, there are open question. Does this mean Slovenia is returning, at a different level, to its old role of mediating between the now former Yugoslav republics? Or do you rather see yourselves in a special relationship with neighboring Croatia?

[Thaler] We are realists. We try not to miss any opportunities. But we have few illusions. With Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] we have achieved what was possible. The same goes for Bosnia, which is now in a privileged position, in our view, because of the reconstruction. Our management has considerable know-how there. Croatia is an important partner, precisely because it is a neighbor. Trade increased again in 1995. We are offering Croatia a free trade zone; this is a clear option. It is true that a few issues from 1991 are still open. They result from independence. They involve securing ownership of formerly public enterprises; the exact borders must be set down, even though the border is known and is very old and has not changed compared with the former Federation; there is the issue of foreign currency deposits in Ljubljanska Banka; and there is the Krsko nuclear power station, which is a joint venture. We know that Croatia has been busy with other things over the past years—the occupation of its territory and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was no capacity to settle open questions with Slovenia. We are interested in a European Croatia. Just as we are little interested in Europe establishing its border in the Karawanken, so we do not want such a border on our southeastern border. It should be further southeast. However, I would not speak of alliances within the framework of the former Yugoslavia. This is over. We are not interested in being part of the game on the map of the former Yugoslavia.

[Mappes-Niediek] Croatia has meanwhile become stronger. It sees itself as a special alliance partner of the United States and feels militarily successful in the Krajina and in Bosnia. Has this changed the atmosphere in negotiations with Slovenia?

[Thaler] No. Over recent weeks I have felt that there is more interest in an agreement with Slovenia. There is a certain change in the situation: They want to join the Council of Europe and want a cooperation agreement with the EU. There they realize that they need Slovenia. It is located geographically between them and Europe. This is very rational. Having Slovenia as an opponent would not be helpful for Croatia's European ambitions.

Slovenia: Peterle Favors Thaler No-Confidence Motion

AU1604145396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovene foreign policy has been full of solo moves and tactical games in the last year and a half while the minister was not up to his task. This is the assessment with which Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Christian Democrats, supported the party decision to support the no-confidence vote in Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler at the next State Chamber session.

The Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats have not yet seriously discussed Thaler's replacement, if the no confidence motion succeeds. In Peterle's opinion, it would be best if the new foreign minister were an experienced diplomat and not party-affiliated. The Christian Democrats do not plan to put forward a candidate for the president of the Committee for International Relations because the Liberal Democrats could not guarantee their votes for a possible candidate of the Christian Democrats. If anything changes in the formation of the Committee for European Affairs, the Christian Democrats will propose a party candidate for the president of this committee.

Slovenia: Magazine Criticizes Kucan, Role in 'Kaminsky Affair'

AU1504164296 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 3 Apr 96 p 19

[Commentary by Danilo Slivnik: "May the President Lie?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No, principally no. However, this is like it is at Radio Erevan. The president (of a country), according to the rules, should not lie, but many do so nevertheless. If he does lie, he should make sure that he does not get caught. Because U.S. President Richard Nixon lied about the Watergate affair, he had to leave the White House two years later, and the U.S. public never again believed any of their Presidents only on the basis of their statements. Milan Kucan [Slovene president] is, thank God, not Nixon (because we would have to fear him for the great power that Nixon had), but he is obviously following in his footsteps. He gets mixed up in untruths, says one thing and does another, and explains some of his deeds only with great difficulty. This is certainly not good for anyone, and least of all for the country. We are thus all together slowly changing into an extremely conflictive society in which no one believes anyone else, and the president's word is becoming something that it in no way should be—a kind of synonym for transition, which is regarded by some as the greatest "fraud of the century."

However, all his political pretense [sprenevedanje] was nothing in comparison with the recent handling of the Kaminsky affair. Against all expectations, this affair made public the fact that his weapons lobby, in the background, is setting up connections to prepare purchases from U.S. aircraft manufacturers (apparently involving the purchase of F-16 fighters) and that he is personally involved in this matter. His indignation was understandable when he found out that SOVA [Slovene Information-Security Agency] had prepared a report about the forthcoming arrival of "emissary" Phyllis Kaminsky and that it had dared to send a copy of the report to Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, who knew nothing about the entire issue. SOVA, and its director, Drago Fers, can only be commended on the matter, but at the time of the uncovering of the affair, Milan Kucan responded like a typical former communist ruler.

He tried to deny everything forcefully and threatened all those who continued to inquire about the matter with penal proceedings. He also demanded that everyone involved in the matter should "deny everything." However, there was not much to deny, as events from last Monday onwards confirmed the content of the report regardless of whether it was authentic or not.

That is why the presence of the repressive demands within his denial was especially uncomfortable since he suddenly showed his roughness (and two-faced quality) and demanded the "immediate pursuit" [pregon] of all those who could be held guilty for uncovering the affair. If we were, by some coincidence, still living in the old system, when he, as the president of the party, had absolute authority, then the denial would certainly be accompanied by a personally signed prison sentence for all those that spoke publicly about the Kaminsky affair. The criminologists were so frightened that they went into action on the very next day (this has never happened in similar cases) without really knowing what they were looking for—the counterfeiters [ponarejevalec] of the SOVA report or only those who had supposedly made it public. Three days later, it turned out that some kind of a SOVA report regarding the Kaminsky dossier certainly did exist and that Kucan's quick denials were forced and (according to the logic of events) made up. President Kucan thus found himself in an uncomfortable situation since he had put his entire reputation at stake and had lost a great deal of trust. He also uncovered the fact that one side of him pats grandmothers on the shoulder and flatters himself in public while the other side takes care of transitional problems for the benefit of the former party nomenclature in the political background.

We are now dealing with Milan Kucan himself. Who is this man really, and what role has he played in Slovene politics since the party decided to step down from power and officially accept the policy of transition? On the outside, he is one of the most popular politicians, a man high on all public opinion charts. Many people trust him, although they do not even know why he deserves that trust. However, that is only one side of him. The other is the invisible side, hidden, with the task of taking care of the largest possible "transfer" of former nonlegal party political and economic power into a legal multiparty one. According to this, Slovenia would again change into a larger "party province." The contradiction is not illogical, but only apparent: Milan Kucan is working according to the interests of the party that he once belonged to and that he cannot escape from. And that is likely to be the reason for his chronic political "amnesia." It is thus always the same. He knew nothing regarding the events in Depala Vas nor did he know anything about the Maribor weapons affair. He basically never heard of illegal property ownership, the economic malversations in some large Slovene companies (in

Videm, Tam, Hit, Safti, Iskra, and so on) are unknown to him, the economic decay of Slovenia has been made up, and so on. In short, the man knows nothing.

We are interested in whether he knows the whereabouts of the party membership money that, at the end of 1989, amounted to 17.4 million German marks and that was first put "in a safe place" in Trieste and later into hidden accounts in Swiss and German banks.... The undersigned [Slivnik] is also interested in this fact as a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Slovenia, since I could, after all, be able to get a tolar or two back.

Federal

FRY: Daily Comments on IMF Talks, Continuity Issue

AU1704093896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Apr 96 p 11

[Article by Bojana Jager: "Small Deals for the 'Zero Option'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What did the federal government in fact (not) want to achieve at the talks with the IMF in Paris?

One could say that it has been pursuing its old, and until now, unsuccessful attempts to achieve the continuity of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the former country. The change in circumstances came after the announcement on the position of the UN Committee for Legal Affairs. This announcement was made with a few months delay (precisely on 19 March, just before the talks with the Fund). It reflects the opinion that this body suggests to the UN General Secretary what to do in the event that the UN regulations give no precise indication how to solve the problem of succession. Here, too, it was said that there is no change in the rights and obligations of states that have had boundary changes or have experienced a reduction in territory. The rights and obligations remain with the predecessor state, whereas the new states must achieve the status of new states. The example of the "divorce" [razvod] of the USSR was also mentioned, where Russia remained the predecessor state and inherited all the rights that resulted from this. It was furthermore said that, by analogy, all this is also valid for the former SFRY [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia], and that its rights and obligations are not in dispute.

As we have found out from circles close to the government, this interpretation was viewed as a real chance to finally realize the desired so-called zero option and elegantly secure a return to world organizations, the first step of which would be occupy the empty seat for Yugoslavia in the General Assembly. It has even been heard that a brief resolution was made after Dayton in which our country was called on to do just that, but it was not said where and how it got stuck. The same procedure would then be repeated elsewhere—in the IMF, World Bank, regional banks, and other international organizations. At least that is what was hoped by those who set up the platform for talks with the Fund and put together the delegation that will accompany, and some say also keep an eye on, [FRY National Bank] Governor Avramovic. It turned out that the Yugoslav delegation, dreaming of all these great things, was in fact sent to Paris to take care of small matters—to hold talks on the technical aspects of the issue of membership in this international organization (it was suggested that anything else would be considered premature) and to leave the "flea" [buva] of continuity. Avramovic has, as they say, spoiled this strategy by citing the analogy drawn by the UN regarding regulation of membership. A cynical comment from someone close to the federal government said that he thought he would do "epochal tasks for history."

It was later explained that the FRY is striving to maintain state-legal and political continuity with the former state, but not full economic continuity. This is simply a recognition of reality, although many experts have been asking how logical it is to ask for one and not the other. Full economic continuity would also mean, for instance, recognition of all the debts of the former SFRY, as well as the later dispute with the former republics, which, of course, no one here wants. That is why it is emphasized that the issue of succession, or of what from the previous marriage will belong to whom, is still open. The only matter that needs to be taken care of are the views of the former Yugoslav republics, which are still so far apart that one can see neither the beginning nor the end of this process. Moreover, some of the former republics have already negotiated a considerable deal regarding their external debt with foreign creditors. They are on the threshold of a reprogramming, and have all solved their problems regarding membership in the IMF. No normal person expects the foreign decisionmakers to do all this again from the beginning, for any reason.

When he returned from Paris, Governor Avramovic said that the IMF representatives were confused regarding our succession claims because they thought that all these matters had already been taken care of in 1992 and 1993, when the FRY agreed to the proportion of 36.5 percent of the former SFRY capital in the Fund. The fact that the FRY has already accepted the division of the previous national quota of the Fund is explained, in the latest domestic adaptation, as an issue of the application of a mathematical formula and the statute of the Fund, and not as an issue of state continuity. According to this, it transpires that the Fund in Paris was represented by people who did not even know the basic act of their organization. These quotas are determined in accordance with regulated criteria concerning the strength of a state, the size of its population, national product, and suchlike. For all participants in former Yugoslavia all this changed considerably after the disappearance of the former state. Unfortunately, in time it may turn out that even this division is not adequate and not to the benefit of the FRY. Governor Avramovic warned of all this on his return by saying, "We could also manage with a smaller proportion, since Yugoslavia today is not as strong economically as some other parts of the former SFRY."

As it is not to Governor Avramovic, this is quite clear to the federal government and those whose opinion it represents. The "light weapon" [svijetlo oruzje] is still fighting its initial battle, but with the conviction that the famous state-legal and political continuity will now go through. Truly, such optimism is not confirmed by the latest statements made by western diplomats. According to them, the recognition of our country by some European states does not mean that the FRY will soon fill the empty seat in the United Nations, and as the successor of former Yugoslavia. That is because this decision is to be made by the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the opinions of these two bodies are split on exactly this issue. Moreover, in the EU's latest announcement on the occasion of the mutual recognition of the FRY and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, our country is referred to only "as one of the successor states of the SFRY."

The other issue that the governor brought up, regarding how to deal with the money that is located abroad, he described as the main misunderstanding between the federal government and himself, and says it has been deliberately suppressed. It is mentioned neither by the Federal Prime Minister Kontic, nor by Kosta Mihajlovic, nor by the head of the PKJ [Chamber of Commerce of Yugoslavia] Mihajlo Milojevic, who even claims that he would resign if the country did not strive for its continuity. Apart from Governor Avramovic, no one seems to be afraid of a new hyperinflation. Nor is any one afraid of the fact that with $300 million in foreign currency reserves, this country has no chance of setting its economic apathy [mrtvilo] into motion. That is, what is in view is another continuity of economic and social ruin.

FRY: President, Directors of Military Industries Meet

LD1604173096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1456 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Apr (TANJUG)—Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, has received representatives of Yugoslavia's special purpose industry and discussed with them the development plans and programs of the industry with the aim of a recovery in production, the military office of the FRY president announced today.

President Lilic had talks with Milan Ciric, director of Krusik [metalworking industry] in Valjevo; Vukasin Filipovic, director of Zastava's special purpose factory in Kragujevac; Radomir Ljujic, director of Sloboda [metalworking and electrical industry] in Cacak; Zarko Radosavljevic, director of Prvi Partizan in Uzice; Rados Milovanovic, director of Milan Blagojevic [chemical industry] in Lucani; Radovan Sekularac, director of Prva Iskra in Baric [near Belgrade]; Bogoljub Mirkovic, director of 4 November in Mojkovac [Montenegro]; and Vlatko Perazic, director of 1 December in Pljevlja.

The statement says that "the most important task is to utilize capacities to the fullest in the programs of the existing range for which there is interest from the Yugoslav Army and the foreign market, and also to take all other necessary measures to convert surplus capacity for the needs of the civilian market."

To this end the special purpose industry will continue to have the support of the institutions of the FRY, the statement says.

"Agreement was reached on what are the essential steps and measures to achieve these objectives, based on the fact that the special purpose industry has the essential prerequisites in the major production capacities, experienced engineering, and other professional teams and highly qualified workers, the talks between President Lilic and the representatives of the Yugoslav special purpose industry concluded," the statement adds.

Also present at the talks were Pavle Bulatovic, federal minister for defense; Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army; Lieutenant Col. Gen. Radojica Kadijevic, assistant federal minister for defense for military-economic activities; and Lt. Jovan Cekovic, director of the federal department for trade in special-purpose products.

Serbia

Serbia: Belgrade Mayor Condemns Mosque Explosion

LD1604165996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1619 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Apr (TANJUG)—Belgrade Mayor Nebojsa Covic today commented on last night's explosion in front of the Bajrakli mosque in Belgrade. He told reporters that what had happened was "ugly, uncivilized, and unnecessary."

Belgrade will do everything to prevent this from happening again, Covic said and added that the authorities in the capital are doing everything to protect all religious communities in Belgrade.

Serbia: UNHCR Says Belgrade Holds Another Bosniak Refugee

AU1604165696 Paris AFP in English 1638 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, April 16 (AFP)—Serbian authorities have detained a Bosnian Moslem refugee bringing to 14 the number being prevented from returning home as part of an investigation into alleged war crimes, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Tuesday [16 April].

Belgrade initially said last week that 13 were being held on suspicion of war crimes. They gave no reason for detaining the 14th, held back from a group of 27 refugees leaving for Finland on Tuesday, a UNHCR spokeswoman said.

"We don't really understand why he's being held," the UNHCR's Ruth Marshall said, adding that the agency hoped that all 14 would be allowed to leave later this week.

Serbian authorities have cited bureaucracy as the reason for the delay.

The Yugoslav Interior Ministry told the UNHCR last week that the 13 refugees then being held needed exit visas, the processing of which "could take weeks."

A group of 211 Bosnian Moslem refugees, who had been housed in refugee camps in Serbia for most of the past year, left for Bosnia last Wednesday.

Serbia: Muslims To Be Released From Serb Refugee Center

LD1604221896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2207 GMT 16 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 16 (TANJUG)—A U.N. refugee agency official said Tuesday that Yugoslav authorities had given assurances they would release 13 Muslims from a Serbian refugee centre as soon as possible.

Ambassador in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Zlatan Kikic conveyed Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic's assurances to this effect to the special envoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Soren Jessen Petersen in a meeting in Belgrade earlier in the day.

Petersen said after the meeting that he was satisfied with his talks in Belgrade and hoped that the entire matter concerning the refugees was the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding.

He added that, on his return to Sarajevo, he would report about the matter to the international community's high representative in Bosnia Carl Bildt who he said was personally very much interested in seeing it resolved.

Petersen said that 224 Muslims, with duly issued travel papers, had been due to leave Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the UNCHR on April 10, but that Yugoslav authorities had detained 13 of them shortly before departure.

The 13 are now in the UNHCR refugee centre in Padinska Skela, near Belgrade.

A group of 796 Muslims, who fled to Yugoslavia when the army of the (Bosnian Serb) Republika Srpska seized the Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa on August 1, 1995, had been accommodated in the Sljivovica refugee centre near Bajina Basta in western Serbia.

They were in the care of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The UNHCr and the International Migration Organisation have helped 550 of them to go to third countries of their choice—Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States of America.

Serbia: SPO Says Government Seeks Bank Governor's Removal

LD1604181496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1539 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Apr (SRNA)—Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman for the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], warned today that the regime in Serbia is trying all means to remove Dragoslav Avramovic, the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

"They are trying to remove Avramovic on the orders of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic," Kovacevic said at a news conference in Belgrade, adding that the National Bank governor had uncovered a number of thefts committed by people in the state leadership itself.

Kovacevic said that the scheduled meeting between Milosevic and Avramovic yesterday did not take place because the Serbian president did not turn up at the appointed time.

He also said that despite its earlier decision not to take part in the work of the Federal parliament, the SPO would return to the FRY Assembly if there was to be a vote of confidence on Avramovic.

The SPO spokesman also disclosed an alleged plan of the Yugoslav United Left [JUL], which, he said, in the event of the victory of Zyuganov in the presidential elections in Russia, would have a showdown with ideological opponents in the ruling parties of Serbia and Montenegro.

"If this happened there would be major purges in which the speakers of both parliaments would be targeted as well as other prominent politicians. After that an open threat would be directed at Montenegrin President Mile Djukanovic to force his resignation," Kovacevic warned.

He claimed that the ultimate aim of these actions would be the establishment of puppet regimes in Romania and Bulgaria and the territorial integration of the former socialist states into a new Warsaw pact, which would be negotiated in Belgrade and would be called the Belgrade pact.

"According to information available to us, if there is internal resistance in Serbia, Milosevic's police would have the task of arresting all leaders of the democratic opposition parties and also generals and officers in the Yugoslav Army, who are already opposing such a scenario," Kovacevic warned.

Serbia: JUL Said To Maneuver Against SPS in Vojvodina

AU1604205796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by M. Kalinic: "Conflict With the Socialists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The penetration of JUL [Yugoslav Left] onto the territory of Vojvodina has been slowed down by resistance to the "expansion of the left wave." At least that is what Zivko Sokolovacki, JUL coordinator for Vojvodina and a member of its directorate, claims, with the remark that "the situation has been improving." The entrance of JUL onto the political scene of Srem was announced several months ago by Vladislav Trecak, coordinator of the left-wing movement for the Srem district, here better known as the former director of the Matroz company. Trecak is also known for his statement that "in Vojvodina, there are certain processes that do not have much to do with those when, in 1988, we showed our orientation toward a unified Serbia. We have experienced an opposite situation—namely that in Mitrovica, Srem, and Vojvodina, native inhabitants have been pushed aside to a great extent."

The statement has provoked a fierce reaction on a much broader plane; even POLITIKA EKSPRES, which is close to the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], published an "anti-JUL" commentary. At the same time the public wondered: Has the project for a "unified Serbia" started deteriorating? Why are the "fighters from the antibureaucratic revolution" joining JUL? And then, is the JUL, in defending the natives, actually trying to attract autonomists to its side. And finally, is JUL opening a front against the SPS in the northern province? Even supporters of JUL have started accusing the SPS for its "sponsorship" of the emigration of the non-Serb population.

The promotion of JUL in the very heart of Srem, in Ruma, showed that this was not merely a storm in a glass of water; its slogan was "for the freedom of all people and of peace," with a special emphasis on "all." On that occasion, it was said that JUL "welcomes all people who have not been discredited through their previous activities in politics." But it seems that there were a lot of the "discredited" people in Indjija—since the birth pains of the JUL lasted several months there because of the lack of "undiscredited" cadres. The "suitable," "perspective," and so on cadres have all been in the SPS—they are the directors of companies, and none of them has changed his political costume.

In that way, JUL had to be satisfied with what has been left of the "honest intellectuals, workers, peasants, and private entrepreneurs." Stara Pazova is of particular interest to JUL because of the national structure of the population (half Serb, half Slovak). The latter are interesting because of the enforcement of the policy of the "equality of all people."

Montenegro

Montenegro: Yugoslav Left Movement Planning Expansion

AU1604204696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by N.T.: "'Ground Construction' Completed, Promotions Follow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Yugoslav Left [JUL] is about to start a political offensive in Montenegro. As we have unofficially found out, the plan is for the JUL to launch a number of promotions in Montenegro at the end of April or the beginning of May, following the conclusion of ground "construction."

The formation of the municipal organizational net is about to be finished. Out of [number indistinct] municipalities in Montenegro, initiative committees have been formed in [number indistinct], whereas JUL municipal committees have been constituted in two (Podgorica and Danilovgrad). Initiative committees are now being formed on the coast and in the north of the Republic. In the Montenegrin seat of the JUL they do not say anything about the number of members, but claim that everything is going as planned.

The president of the JUL Directorate, Mira Markovic, will most likely also be present at the promotions (at the JUL we were told that the last time Mira Markovic was present at a promotion in Montenegro was around a year ago, and that it had been thoroughly inadequately presented in the Montenegrin media). "Perhaps President Markovic will not be present at all the promotions, but we expect her to be present at least at the most important ones," the Montenegrin JUL people say.

Jovica Martinovic, representative and spokesman of this movement for Montenegro, claims that the relationship between Montenegrin authorities and the JUL is correct. Martinovic explains: There are actually no conflicts between Mira Markovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic (who, according to many analysts, is the main opponent to the expansion of JUL in this Republic); those are journalists' exaggerations and rumors. (However, it can be observed that these days the SK-PJ [Union of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia] expresses a negative attitude toward the Montenegrin prime minister in their public appearances.)

In the leadership of the JUL it can unofficially be heard that the latest congress of Socialists was useful for this movement with regard to Montenegro. The appeal for cooperation among leftist forces that was aired at the congress, and in general the cadre "refreshment" of the Socialists—in the unofficial evaluatation of some JUL officials—does not leave a lot of hope for opponents to the expansion of the JUL in Montenegro. At the same time, the speech of President Momir Bulatovic was well received by the Montenegrin JUL members.

According to Martinovic, it is still early to talk about the possibility of the JUL participating in Republic elections together with another party, so such a solution has still not been discussed in the competent bodies. Unlike Serbia, at the end of the year Montenegro will, besides federal and local elections, hold Republic elections as well.

Kosovo

Kosovo: PLK Says FRY Recognition May 'Escalate Conflict'

AU1704094896 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 17 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by F.A.: "Recognition of the Self-Proclaimed Yugoslavia May Cause Conflict in Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prishtina, 16 April—The reports by the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms and the representation of chronicles of violence all over Kosova testify that the situation in the Republic of Kosova is extremely grave and that Serbia has not accomplished any of its commitments to the international community that it would eventually favor a fair solution to the Kosova issue. On the contrary, resorting to the most inhuman and perfidious methods, Serbia has stepped up its violence against the Albanian people in all fields of life, in the political and economic sphere, education, health, and culture, with the aim of Serbianizing and colonizing Kosova. This was stated at the news conference held by the Liberal Party of Kosova [PLK] on 15 April.

The PLK assesses that recognition of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, which in fact is considered as Greater Serbia by some European Union countries, is a hasty step that may escalate conflict in Kosova. This step can in no way contribute to resolving the Kosova issue on the basis of the will of its populace, declared in a referendum for independence and self-determination, as a natural, political, and fundamental right of the Albanian people, which no one can deny but through violence, police, and army, and for a certain period of time, but not for ever.

Analyzing the current circumstances and the way the foreign factor is approaching the Albanian issue in the former Yugoslavia, the PLK assesses that if the expressed will for independence of the Republic of Kosova is being ignored, then we should put forward the issue of accomplishing the right of the Albanian people from the territory of former Yugoslavia to unite with the mother state, Albania, as a natural right of all the peoples in the world.

Kosovo: Divisions Growing Among Kosovo, Metohija Albanians

LD1504144696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1349 GMT 15 Apr 96

["Pool" item by Djordje Jevtic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Serbia, April 15 (TANJUG)—The ethnic Albanian political scene in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija has altogether been struck by disagreements and divisions.

Albanian-language press in Pristina said ethnic Albanian politicians had clashed over the ethnic Albanian issue and the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, the promises secessionist leaders had not fulfilled and the international community's unequivocal warning that ethnic Albanians must solve all their issues within Serbia and Yugoslavia.

A strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement has for years been operating in the province that is predominantly populated by ethnic Albanians. The movement is aimed at detaching the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia and attaching it to neighbouring Albania.

The ethnic Albanian political scene is dominated by a secret struggle for power between self-styled president of the illegal 'Republic of Kosovo,' Ibrahim Rugova, and Adem Demaci, who is believed to be of an even more radical orientation and who is trying to unite all ethnic Albanian political forces in the province.

Dissatisfied with what he calls Rugova's passive resistance and what he believes has pacified ethnic Albanians, Demaci launched a campaign two months ago aimed at winning a seat in the illegal and at this point inactive assembly of the 'Republic of Kosovo' in an attempt to become its president and bring it back to life again.

Demaci's move has resulted in divisions not only among ethnic Albanian politicians, but also among members of Rugova's party, the press said.

Rugova is, however, believed to be trying to prevent Demaci from becoming ethnic Albanian leader because he fears that the activating of the illegally elected assembly might lead to a deterioration of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

Reports on the struggle for power between Rugova and Demaci have prompted ethnic Albanians working abroad to have a statement published in the local Bujku newspaper to the effect that they are exasperated by what is happening in the ethnic Albanians' ranks.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Commission Reports Ethnic Relations 'Stable'

LD1604193596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1757 GMT 16 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, April 16 (TANJUG)—The commission for inter-ethnic relations of the Socialist Party of Serbia's main board in Vojvodina said on Tuesday that inter-ethnic relations in that northern Serbian province were stable and that the legal security of all citizens was being realized.

The high degree of tolerance, mutual esteem, and respect of citizens of different nationalities is a basis for promoting coexistence in the province, where members of 26 nations, national minorities, and ethnic groups live, said a statement adopted by the commission session.

The statement said members of national minorities in Serbia had secured collective rights to the use of language, education, and information in their native language, nursing of national culture and other national characteristics.

In addition to Serbian, other languages in official use in Vojvodina are Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Ruthenian, said the statement. The commission will continue to monitor the realization of the policy of national equality in all areas of life where it is realized in practice, the statement said.

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